

JPRS 81558

17 August 1982

West Europe Report

No. 2015

FBIS

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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GENERAL SAYS 'NO FIRST USE' IDEA WOULD MAKE U.S. 'MINOR POWER'

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Jun 82 pp 15-26

[Article by General Pierre M. Gallois: "Four Steps Toward 'Disengagement'"]

[Excerpts] General Gallois responds here to the offensive conducted by the four personalities of the American political world who published, in the Spring issue of the review FOREIGN AFFAIRS, an article on no first use of nuclear weaponry. Furthermore, that review is a well-known tribune which one of the four, George Kennan, had used in 1947 to define the doctrine of "containment."

Quite unintentionally--and for a while--General Galtieri created some cohesion in NATO. It was necessary for the United States to make a choice, and it turned toward Great Britain, supporting its cause. Less harmlessly, without a doubt, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, McGeorge Bundy and Gerard Smith are trying to loosen the last bonds that still unite the industrial countries of the West in the same destiny.¹

Using a tribune that is authoritative in this area, the four personalities of United States politics and top-level administration have banded together to strike a new blow at a military coalition that some abusively consider to be vacillating. By calling on the American government to renounce--if need be--the first use of weapons of mass destruction in favor of the European allies, they are undermining the very foundations of a defensive organization that was set up on the initiative of the United States and that would go into action only in accordance with its strategic concepts. If these four personages were heeded within NATO, they would reduce their own country to the rank of a minor power. They would lead the American command of the Alliance to call for the return back across the Atlantic of the U.S. contingents stationed in Europe, since they could not play there the leading role that has been theirs for a quarter of a century.

The four signatories of this new manifestation of American withdrawal seem to forget that the European countries of NATO placed confidence in their powerful ally, that they created together a defensive system based on the indissociable combination of the nuclear weaponry that could be brandished by America and conventional contingents that it is their task to furnish, since they were not

authorized to equip themselves with modern weapons, similar to those that the opposing party possesses in abundance. What is more, these same European allies were urged by the United States to subscribe to the provisions of the non-proliferation treaty, so that, never possessing themselves the means for their security, they would put themselves under American nuclear protection for an indeterminate period, if not for ever. Thus it shows a certain ignorance of military affairs, or obvious bad faith, to proclaim that the European member countries of NATO, with a total population of more than 250 million and now possessing sizable material resources, could provide for their security themselves. The United States has behaved in such a way that this form of territorial status quo could not even be envisioned. After the United States strove to make this unachievable, it is uncalled-for, to say the least, to urge the West Europeans to depend on it.

After the signing of the Washington treaty, a good many disengagement measures were subsequently proposed. It is a long time now that, in the United States, "deterrence extended" to territories other than those over which the stars and stripes wave has been considered dangerous and challenged. The evolution of strategic ideas goes hand in hand--and this is normal--with the evolution of weaponry. For so long as the soil of the United States remained geographically beyond striking distance, it was militarily rational, in the event of a serious folly committed by the rival power, to brandish the nuclear lightning. The risk was not a trivial one, at least morally; but the value of the European stakes justified its being taken. All the more so in that neither the population nor the material goods of the United States were exposed to destruction. This situation of natural invulnerability lasted for a decade, until about 1960. The Soviet Union could marshal a good many heavy airplanes, but these craft did not at all have the ability to hit the American reprisal bombers at their airports. These bases--in West Europe, on the Pacific islands and in the heart of the American continent--could not have been hit by surprise all at once, with the planes on the ground. The distances between these air bases and the electromagnetic-detection zones of the allied radars prohibited this form of surprise. The Soviet air formations--detected, for example, at midnight over the territory of the FRG and in the vast Canadian north at the same time--would have reached the American airports in Great Britain 2 or 3 hours later, but those in Texas more than 15 hours later. By means of the advanced bases that it furnished to the Strategic Air Command, NATO thus contributed to the "survival" of the United States' means of reprisal, and consequently to its safety. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, could doubt that it would be attacked from nearly all points of the compass.

It was not irrational, at the time, to rely on massive reprisals. Contrary to what has been said and written since, it was not at all a matter of exterminating the Soviet populations in their centers of concentration, but rather, upon the first manifestations of a strong aggression, taking the initiative of use of the atom against the land, air and naval units embodying such aggression. Despite all that has been said, written and done, NATO, to be effective, still has no other choice today.

"The march toward parity in long-range systems," write the Four, "was considered to necessitate a lower-level equilibrium on the international level." One

could, in effect, interpret Chancellor Schmidt's speech in London (1977) in this way. When he took up, on his account, the idea of "parity," one of the signatories² of the FOREIGN AFFAIRS article should have recalled what he himself had written several years earlier: "With real politicians here or in the Soviet Union, a decision that would lead only to the dropping of a single hydrogen bomb on one city of our two countries would be considered a priori as a catastrophic mistake; 10 bombs on 10 cities would constitute a disaster unprecedented in history; and 100 bombs on 100 cities is inconceivable." President Kennedy's former adviser was undoubtedly right. But how, then, can one come to ridicule weak-against-strong deterrence or argue from the grounds of numerical parity?

Happily for Europe, and for the United States also, the four signatories of the text published by FOREIGN AFFAIRS have not failed to fall into error quite systematically. Despite his pertinent analyses of Soviet society and the politics of the Kremlin,³ George Kennan sometimes advanced some singularly naive notions. Thus, in April 1941 he wrote to his department that "it cannot be said that the driving force of German policy is a sadistic desire to see other peoples suffer under their law. On the contrary, the Germans want very much to make their new subjects happy; they are ready for what represents, for them, considerable compromises in order to achieve this result." Perhaps! The least that can be said is that they did not have the manner. Again it was Kennan who, in February 1945, asked that Europe be divided into zones of influence. He doubtlessly did not imagine that in Russian, zone of influence would mean zone of occupation, then annexation. Returning from Belgrade, where he was ambassador. George Kennan declared with the greatest seriousness: "I am going to do all I can to prevent war.... There is no more terrifying hypothesis than the one nourished by certain people who would break up the world on the basis of the personal judgment they make on the aspects of an evolving situation. I cannot tolerate the future of humanity being made to depend on decisions by a group of people basing themselves on limited perspectives and short-sighted speculation." The ambassador had not yet grasped the fact that it was not he who "could prevent war," but rather the nature of the weaponry deployed on the one side and the other.

As for Gerard Smith, it is difficult for him to derive any glory from having cooperated in the working-out of the "multilateral farce" (1961-1964), and especially, from having led the American delegation in the debates on limitation of strategic armaments. Apart from the fact that there was no limitation but on the contrary, these negotiations stimulated the arms race instead of braking it, the agreement signed in Moscow in May 1972 confirmed the potential superiority of the Soviets over the Americans. This advantage would not have any strategic importance if the United States--and the West behind it--did not argue on the basis of its self-styled inferiority in order to curtail its commitments in the world, and some, on the other side of the Atlantic, wondered whether the good old days of the Monroe Doctrine were not of current relevance again.

As for Mr McNamara, he has shown himself to be the master of sophistry. Arriving in the Pentagon at the time when computers were being installed all over the world, he let it be known that from his office he could interrogate 62 computers and that he obtained a certain infallibility from this. The new secre-

tary of defense forgot that the computer puts out any errors put into it, and that while the cost of the installation might perhaps "ennoble" the responses, they are not any better-founded for all that. And there was, for example, the famous Athens speech⁴, later repeated to the students of Ann Arbor: "Deterrent forces of limited size, used in an independent manner, are dangerous, expensive and doomed to rapid outdated, while as regards deterrence, they cannot be the instruments of an antiforces strategy." At the very moment when McNamara was expressing himself this way, the Americans and the Russians were putting to sea in their first missile-launching submarines, of which the secretary of state [as published] said, in the same speech, that they were invulnerable. The computer had not made a comparison of the two assertions. McNamara, an upholder of the doctrine of "appropriate response," tried to give himself the means for it. "Appropriate response," applied to Vietnam, led to disaster. The computer had not taken into account the adversary's determination and his refusal to play the game of a war that he was supposed to admit to losing.

It would go the same way in Europe, where the determination and the constraints of the potential enemy--led by his own system to win out--are never taken into consideration.

Instead of enlightening the various sectors of public opinion about the conditions for maintenance of the state of nonwar, the Four strive to respond to the sentiments that they express, and they thus keep up their fears. Instead of foreseeing the consequences of the evolution of armaments--which their country knows so well how to accelerate--they treat only of the exchange of thousands of megatons over the oceans and the Iron Curtain. After all the talk, over the years, of apocalypse (improperly) and holocaust, it is normal for the public to fear them and to be ready to make any concession in order to put it off. But vis-a-vis the public, they have to be careful to add: "The evolution of nuclear systems, nearly equivalent on each side and representing an excessive disproportionate power of destruction, has aroused new anxieties about all the forms of nuclear war," write the Four. This is doubtlessly the public's feeling. The reality is somewhat different. If the American Pershing II does indeed achieve precision of some 50 meters from a distance of 2,000 kilometers and if the explosive that it carries is in the low-kilotons range, there are strong reasons for thinking the Soviet Union will arrive, after a certain time lag, at the same result. This is a general tendency. The megatonnage is decreasing on either side. If the USSR still deploys missiles said to have a power of 20 megatons, they are doubtlessly missiles aimed at solidly protected silos. The NATO countries in Europe do not entertain such objectives.

On the other hand, the conventional combat at which the authors of the FOREIGN AFFAIRS article seem to arrive, in the extreme, could lead to the confrontation of several tens of thousands of tanks, escorted by the corresponding artillery. If the FRG were the theater of such an encounter, some 50 million human beings would be the victims of a terrible carnage. In 48 hours of fighting--on the assumption that there would be a fight--German housing would be completely destroyed. Such a prospect is far more terrifying than the state of assured nonwar imposed by nuclear weaponry--on the understanding that first use of it would be made if it were necessary.

Deterrence in Europe, exercised with conventional forces, makes no sense. That is when it would lose all credibility. The enormous numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact forces would be so obvious so fast that, like what happened in 1940, defense would collapse. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine Moscow's going along with NATO's views and taking on all the countries of West Europe simultaneously, and with the same vigor. In 1980, it did not go after Asia but Angola; it was not all of Africa but Angola, then Ethiopia; not the entire Middle East but South Yemen. A glance at the map of the western isthmus of Europe shows that the attacker could easily dissociate the northern, central and southern sectors from one another. Protected by its nuclear arsenal, the Soviet Union could, if necessary, concentrate its means against the geographic sector that it hankers after and achieve such superiority there that struggle would lose its meaning, so ridiculous would resistance seem. The Four, lost in their clouds of a bygone time, imagine that for an indeterminate period of time, doubtlessly quite long, the countries of West Europe could build up and maintain conventional forces so numerous and so well-equipped as to appear deterrent. The United States itself demonstrates that this is not an ambition within the capability of the industrial powers. America, with a population of more than 220 million, can only maintain a land fighting force of fewer than 800,000. Its geographical situation, its role in the world, and the political and social state of its population require it to rely on the most advanced weapons rather than just line up rank after rank of soldiers. Furthermore, have the Four asked themselves whether it would be possible, in their country as well as in West Europe, to keep men under arms for 2 years for pay of one franc a day, as is the case in the Soviet Union?

Even if one could imagine that, by way of a collective behavior that is difficult to conceive of, West Europe could one day bring together the means for such a form of "security," it would remain nonetheless at the mercy of East Europe's undertakings. In their reasoning, the Four forget the initiative, which could only be Soviet; surprise, which is its corollary; the choice of the objective, the moment, the weapons, the methods. The countries of West Europe, for their part, could not help but suffer the first assault. Since it would probably be decisive, all they could do would be to conserve the means of reprisal, and those could only be nuclear, and with "first use" if the attacker has not used them himself.

Despite all the developments in weaponry techniques, the Four still hark back to the concepts they advanced more than 20 years ago, when Kennedy was installed in the White House. According to them, West Europe should "settle down" into the conventional, while the new weapons would guarantee only the territories of the two superpowers, with all other conflicts disputed traditionally. Until now, an exception had been made for West Europe, and General Maxwell Taylor granted that America extended its guarantee all the way to the Iron Curtain. What the Four propose is more radical. With "parity" added to the vulnerability of the territory of the United States, and with European neutralism tacked onto all this, it would be better to eliminate the residual risk. This time, provided that the Soviets use only traditional forces, the route of the Atlantic shores is open to them. The Four could have said that such an eventuality was a demented idea, and that while Moscow nourishes some grand designs, it is on condition of there being very little risk in carrying

them out. Thus it is of no great importance that against the 90 big land units of the Warsaw Pact in the Central Europe sector, NATO marshals 23, or 30, or 18. That would have been more rational than to demand of the Europeans that they close such a gap, even partly.

These successive strategies are outstripped by the rate at which new, more precise weapons are being deployed, with lower destructive power and with the damage they cause limited to the targets they are aimed at. It would be puerile to want to get into a kind of race between the number of critical objectives liable to destruction that a defensive coalition such as NATO might present and the number of nuclear warheads that the attacker could launch. Henceforth, precision and its consequences are to be taken into account: factors that do not weaken nuclear deterrence--on the contrary--but that do doom classic deterrence. Technically, the Four are confused about what decade they are in, even if, politically, contemporary events do inspire them.

Contemporary events inspire them because America is again questioning itself. For it, the balance-sheet for the last 2 decades is somber. Yesterday, the confrontations took place on the shores of Eurasia, through the intermediary of allies. Today, the big rival power is present, directly or indirectly, on three continents instead of one. It is even exerting its influence close to the borders of the United States. The Four are pleased to accept this form of galloping expansionism. Thus, again confirming the failures of the policy that they carried out when they exercised their responsibilities in the government or administration, they propose that a sort of new connivance be established between the two great powers: it would be understood on both sides that nuclear weaponry would ensure only the immunity of their respective national territories, while the rest of the world would be disputed by all the other means. In short, by establishment of the idea that the boldest would win the day, the way would be opened to it, and the behavior of the United States would even incite it to commit itself without risks. It happens that this would amount to putting West Europe on the same footing as Vietnam and acquiescing in its suffering the same fate. Or it would amount to making its liberties depend on the constraints that the Soviet Union would by itself impose on it. Furthermore, one may not urge the West Europeans to make concessions, to accept defeatism and "accommodation". In practice, the doctrine of "no first use" would lead to the Monroe Doctrine. At the time, of course, America was growing without risks.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance" (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1982, Vol 60, No 4)
2. McGeorge Bundy.
3. George Kennan, "Memoirs 1925-1950." See in particular the message of 22 February 1946. Published by Atlantic - Little Brown, Boston.
4. Atlantic Council meeting of May 1962, in Athens.

BRIEFS

INFLATION RATE SEEN DROPPING--Inflation is expected to drop to single digit figures this year but the rising value of the dollar may have adverse effects on the prospects, according to the quarterly survey of the Economic Research section of the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce. It says that the trend of the cost of living index for the first six months of the current year indicates an annual inflation rate of 8 percent compared to 10.8 percent in the previous year. But it warns the appreciation of the American dollar vis-a-vis the Cyprus pound may act as a brake to this downward trend of the inflation rate. "If the dollar price towards the Cyprus pound is maintained at these high levels it must be expected that there will be increasing repercussions on imported items, depending on the dollar payments for imported raw material petrol products, semi-finished and final products, the Chamber's report says and adds that in such a case the result would be at some stage to feel pressures not only on the general level of prices but also on the trade balance. The Chamber also expects a rise in unemployment rates from the present 2.8 percent to 3 percent. The survey expresses concern at the growing rate of borrowing and the cost of servicing of the loans since this is not accompanied by corresponding increase of the productive potential of the economy on account of a low investment propensity. Another point noted in the report is that industrial concerns are meeting liquidity problems as a result of falling profit margins and this is reflected in the increase of advances by banks to manufacturing concerns which are faced with difficulties in the foreign markets because of world recession competition and protective tariffs in a number of countries. [Excerpts] [Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 22 Jul 82 p 1]

LIBYAN OIL FOR DEBTS--The Cyprus government has announced it will accept Libyan petrol in payment for debts to Cypriot exporters for goods delivered to Libya. An official announcement after the Council of Ministers weekly meeting yesterday said that the Council approved the delivery of petrol from Libya "for the payment of the monies (Cypriot) manufacturers who exported products to Libya and for which payment is in arrear for over five months." The statement mentioned neither quantities nor amounts but it has been estimated that the amounts due by Libyans to Cypriot exporters are in the region of 30 million dollars and the whole amount must already be overdue since only a small part has been exported during the last five months. The Cypriot exports are covered by an "exports guarantee scheme" by the government but little has been paid under that while negotiations were going on for

Libya to pay and the subjects had been raised at high level during talks in Tripoli by Cypriot Ministers and trade delegations. The suggestion for Libya to pay in oil have been protracted over to differences on price.
[Excerpt] [Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 23 Jul 82 p 1]

CSO: 4600/700

STALINIST ORGAN LOOKS AT COUNTRY'S STAKE IN SIBERIAN PIPELINE

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 30 Jun 82 p 2

[Editorial: "The Siberian Gas Pipeline and Finland"]

[Text] U.S. President Ronald Reagan's decision to extend export bans, which apply to the big gas pipeline to be built from Siberia to Western Europe, is a source of concern for Finns too because large orders in connection with the project have also been coming this way.

The cooperative, METEX [expansion unknown], is to deliver 41 pumping station buildings to the gas pipeline. These will be built in the plants of several Finnish companies. The suppliers are Are Oy, Hana Oy, Kone Oy, Naaraharju Oy and Suomen Puhallintehdas Oy.

METEX general manager, commercial counselor Kauko Uusitalo, is, however, responding to the situation calmly.

"Contracts will be carried out."

According to Uusitalo, the first buildings will be delivered to the Soviet Union in May.

In answer to a question about the possible effect of the U.S. export ban on trade, Uusitalo replied in a matter-of-fact way that the U.S. decision would not affect it.

"This technique is certainly exported a long way off, but it is a domestic one."

The U.S. export ban will primarily affect those deliveries of equipment "to be used in furnishing" the pumping station buildings shipped from Finland.

The METEX general manager said that he did not know any more about this end of the business, but that he guessed that the technology involved was such that the job could not be done anywhere else than in those Western European production plants against which the U.S. measures were aimed.

The chief contractors for the project are the West German-French combine, Mannesmann/Creusot-Loire, and the Italian firm, Nuovo Pignone. According to

Uusitalo, for technical reasons there was a need for the negotiations entered into with these companies.

The total value of the equipment ordered from Finland in connection with the gas pipeline is 1.4 billion marks. In addition to METEX, the Bertel Ekengren Engineering Agency and the HT [expansion unknown] combine, which are to supply future housing complexes in connection with the pumping stations, received orders. These orders will mean thousands of labor years.

11,466
CSO: 3107/147

OULU BECOMING CENTER FOR COUNTRY'S MICROELECTRONICS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 4 Jul 82 p 11

[Article by Maria Planting: "Finland's Silicon Valley Will Soon Be in Oulu"]

[Text] A Finnish Silicon Valley--our version of the great United States electronic center in California--is growing up in Oulu. In order to exploit the possibilities offered by the electronic industry, Oulu city, Oulu University, the Oulu area KERA [expansion unknown] fund and 18 businesses have come together and formed a city company--Oulu Technology City AB--which within a short time will begin activity according to the American model.

"We obviously do not have the resources to copy the model of Silicon Valley," said the new managing director of the company, Timo Patja. But he admits that Silicon Valley on the west coast of the United States was one of the patterns when the idea of the Oulu Technology City was shaped.

The firm has no equivalent in Finland, but abroad similar scientific and research installations or "innovative centers" have functioned for a long time. Besides the United States, the model has been tested in France, England, Ireland and Canada.

Timo Patja is convinced that in Oulu a Finnish model can be created which combines the good properties of foreign solutions and will prove to be successful in practice.

Sleeping Beauty's Dream

The urge to base a city for advanced technology in Oulu caused director Antti Piippo from Aspo Elektronikka to squabble publicly with the decisionmakers of Oulu about 3 years ago. In an interview he grumbled that the city was having a "sleeping beauty's dream" about the electronic industry.

"Still nothing has been done to improve conditions for the electronic industry established here," said Piippo in 1979.

After the interview was published the Oulu city council started moving--the first step was the creation of a working group to consider how the city should be awakened from its dream.

And in March of this year Oulu Technology City AB was founded. Just one month ago Timo Patja was chosen as managing director of the firm. He was previously with VTT [expansion unknown] in the product development unit in Oulu. His task is now to find available space for the beginning until the activity can be moved to the final technology city in 1984.

Construction work on the technology city will begin next year. In the first phase about 2,000 square meters will be built on the 25 hectare area which the city already controls in the Linnainmaa university area behind the university and the VTT activity center.

Activity Idea

The technology city, or the city for advanced technology as it should instead be called, is going to make up a portion of a concentrated activity, the other foundations of which will consist of Oulu University and the activity center of the Government Technical Research Center in Oulu.

"It is the city's intention to give its member firms a favorable environment for such activities as product development, production and marketing needed for advanced technology," explained Patja.

"The firms will partly work together and utilize each other's know-how, and partly apply that knowledge to which they have access in the different research institutions.

"In practice the city offers an environment for innovation with access to advanced skill and knowledge and with rational space and versatile tools," he continued.

Technology City also offers other services--for example, bookkeeping or accounting, restaurant work, etc.--which will support the establishment of a new business and the starting of different development projects.

These ideas for activity are high-flying aims for how the city should work and what it will be able to offer the businesses which move there. Timo Patja is confronting a giant job--partly he must set an entire unique experiment of our lives in motion, and partly he must show how it works in practice.

Massive Support

But he is not worried about challenges. The idea of the technology city has received strong support from all possible directions; researchers, businesses and the authorities have been very positive toward the plan from the beginning.

"The stock was signed off in no time," said Timo Patja, and he showed the list of 18 firms which have been with the project from the beginning. Both large and small firms purchased shares in the city company from the start.

Stock capital of 2 million marks was signed for half by Oulu city and one-tenth by KERA. Oulu University is sharing the rest with Automaatiotekniikka Oy, Farmos Yhtymä Oy, Insinoorityö Oy, Kaapeliteollisuus Oy, Kajaani Oy, Boktryckeriet Kaleva, KOPÖ-Konepohja Oy, MKT-fabrikerna, OMP-Yhtymä Oy, Oulujoki Oy, Uleaborgs Telefon AB, Oulun Rakennus Oy, Pohjolan Voima Oy, Rautaruukki Oy, Sortavalan Sahko Oy, Temelex Oy, Tornion Elpolar Oy and Turveruukki Oy.

"Naturally they will not all fit into the technology city until it is completed," explained Patja. But that is not the intention. The city can function in two different ways for its occupants; partly by offering occasional production space and partly by renting out space for the special sections of some firms.

Space and Installations

The city firm will function as landlord at the same time as it obtains machines and installations for its "tenants," meaning the use of the firms. The company and its managing director can also give assistance in more everyday business, for example he can function as a consultant if needed.

Timo Patja considers it ideal that the technology city is placed in association with the university and VTT; the idea is to create a unity in which the scientific world and commercial business grow closer to each other and can use the knowledge of each other.

Here in the planning phase it seems as though there could be some conflict arise in the activity. That would be when two competing firms would move into the city side by side. Everyone is going to be working close together, and in such intimate cooperation, business secrets are going to be nearly impossible to keep.

"Cooperation between firms must be accepted and understood," said Patja, and he added that the city company would try to coordinate influence so that a competitive situation would not arise.

He is not at all concerned that there will not be enough different kinds of firms or branches to fill the city.

Three Years Time

In 3 years it is intended that Technology City AB will complete its "break-in" period. Then it must go, and--it is hoped--be self-sufficient.

"As soon as the city company has its temporary space to get started in, we will rent it out to the intended firms. At least at the beginning about two-thirds of the city's space will be rented by existing companies," explained Timo Patja.

"Procurement of machinery depends heavily on which these pioneer companies are," he added, and emphasized that the city company intends to invest in machinery which will be needed by tenants.

The only condition is that each tenant must work with something that can be called advanced technology--not only electronic, but also other technology.

9287
CSO: 3109/203

BRIEFS

AFRICA AID APPROVED—Between 1982 and 1984 Finland will participate in the third supplementary funding of the African Development Foundation. Our country's share of the contribution during the 3-year period beginning this year will amount to altogether just under 62 million marks. Eighteen million marks have been earmarked for the development foundation out of the nation's income and expenditures budget for this year. The funds will be deposited with the Bank of Finland from which the foundation may withdraw them as its unfunded projects reach the funding stage. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that in practice the Bank of Finland will begin to release deposits in several years time and payments for the different projects will be distributed over a period of about 10 years. Finland is a founding member of the African Development Foundation, which began its activities in 1973. Finland's share of the foundation is over 1 percent, whereas the other Nordic countries, for example, hold several times that. Denmark and Norway's share of the foundation is 3.5 percent and Sweden's 5.5 percent. The development foundation functions in conjunction with the African Development Bank and it grants long-term interest-free loans for African member-nation development projects. [Text] [Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 2 Jul 82 p 12] 11466

CSO: 3107/147

EEC FINANCING, EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK LOANS REPORTED

Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 21 Jul 82 p 7

[Text]

Gerassimos Arsenis, the Minister of National Economy has announced that the following agreements have been signed with the European Community's bank for long term finance:

— The sum of 1000 million dr. to improve telephone networks in less developed parts of Greece.

— The sum of 300 million dr. for the financing of various public works in the industrial zones of Komotini, Kavala, Volos and Patras.

— The sum of 700 million dr. for widening part of a road from Thessaloniki to the Bulgarian border.

The loans are to be repaid in twelve to fifteen years.

**EUROPEAN
INVESTMENT LOAN**

The European Investment Bank has decided to grant three loans, worth a total of two billion drachmas, to Greece. Mr. Arsenis, the Minister of Economy, announced yesterday that within the next week further loans, worth 5 billion drachmas will be agreed on. That money will be used exclusively in areas where severe damage was caused by last years earthquakes.

The two billion drachmas will be used as follows: 1 billion drachmas to the phone company, OTE, for new programs; 300 million drachmas to the Industrial Bank of Greece, ETBA, for investment in industry in the areas of Komotini, Kavala, Volos, Herakleion and Patras; and 700 million drachmas to the Ministry of Public Works for road building and improvement.

CSO: 4600/700

ECONOMIC

GREECE

BRIEFS

TRADE TALKS WITH USSR--Cooperation between Greece and the Soviet Union was stressed in recent talks in Moscow between the Public Power Corporation of Greece (DEH) and trade and energy representatives from the USSR. The Greek delegation asked the Soviets to help restrict the deficit in the trade balance with Greece by purchasing more Greek products such as firebricks, cables and other products. [Text] [Athens BUSINESS & FINANCE in English No 203, 17 Jul 82 p 13]

CSO: 4600/700

BAYKAL ASSESSES PROBLEMS IN FLOUR INDUSTRY

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 7 Jul 82 p 4

[Text] Cevat Baykal, president of the Istanbul Flour Workers Union-Guilds and Tradesmen's Association, charges Istanbul's "set price" policy with a share of responsibility for declining quality of baked goods produced by his affiliated companies. "Anybody who can find a pastry or cake of true value in Istanbul today should let me know, because the producer who knows he's not going to have any profit left over lets his quality slip," he said.

Noting that his association, which has been active since 1940, has been working to get the "set price" lifted as it constitutes their biggest problem right now, but has had no help from the municipality in solving the problem, Baykal said:

"The municipality's set price policy is the source of the biggest problem experienced today by our members who bake the popular soft pretzels, round cakes, puff pastries, biscuits, bread and Black Sea flat bread. The failure to get positive results from our efforts with the municipality has made the problem more important for the public. Set prices are unreasonable.

"We work with raw materials bought on the free market and sell at prices that are not free. This practice is seen in no economic rules anywhere else in the world, but is allowed to continue here. If they want to continue the price list system applied to us, they should freeze raw material prices as they do in countries like France, Britain and Italy."

Blaming the flour merchants and sesame speculators as the reason why set prices put such a burden on his bakers, Cevat Baykal said that flour prices had gone up 400 percent in one year and sesame prices 325 percent, and even though the state had raised the fees on such inputs as electricity and water, they were expected to sell flour products at the same price.

Indicating that all this had led to declining quality of baked goods today, Istanbul Flour Workers Union-Guilds and Tradesmen's Association President Cevat Baykal continued as follows:

"The important thing is that product standards no longer apply today. For 12 years, it was required that a soft pretzel have 14-15 grams of sesame seeds. With the municipal council's decision, it is as though it had agreed that one soft pretzel should have only 5 grams of sesame seeds today. Therefore, the people of Istanbul are being offered a low-quality soft pretzel. The people of Istanbul do not have to put up with this. Furthermore, it is thought that prices will

become abnormal if they are deregulated. Let them deregulate prices and there will definitely be no abnormal situation. Since free competition promotes better business, higher quality products will be seen."

Cevat Baykal stressed also that what they were asking from the Istanbul municipality was not outrageous under present circumstances and they just wanted a fair price. He then said:

"At our request, a 4-person panel under the Economic Directorate conducted an exhaustive study and concluded that a 75-gram soft pretzel should sell for 15 liras. What the municipal council came up with, however, was a 60-gram pretzel for 10 liras. One can only think that two different municipal bodies are making conflicting decisions, blowing their consumer protection speeches to bits. A 70-gram pretzel may be sold for 15 liras or [as published]. But it is impossible to know how many grams are in the pretzels being sold at present for 10 liras."

Baykal mentioned in conclusion that if the municipality wanted an appropriate price scheme, it would have to do something about the flour mills also as most of the mills were providing low quality flour instead of fine flour. "Just as the municipality is putting the burden on us, it is the public that is being cheated the worst," he said.

8349

CSO: 4654/388

ULUGAY CHARTS HARD ECONOMIC CHOICES

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 7 Jul 82 p 6

[Article by Osman Ulagay: "Tight Money Must Be Squeezed to Save Industry from Crisis"]

[Text] The financial problems which have been put off for a long time by various means have begun to reach the point where they can be put off no longer, especially after the negative atmosphere created by the Kastelli incident, putting hard choices in economic policy on the agenda. On the one hand, the government does not want to let inflation get out of control again or exceed the IMF's money-credit limits, but on the other feels the need to take some kind of measures to "save" the hard-pressed companies and banks, and this leaves the economic policy-makers in a dilemma.

At the bottom of the problem lies the status of the companies whose capital structures are oriented toward the disrupted domestic market. In order to survive, these companies feel the need for (a) cheap and plentiful credit, (b) a remedy for exchange-rate differences, and (c) at least a degree of revival of the domestic market.

Subsidized interest of certain industrial establishments and their inability to survive without high inflation head the list of problems confronting the decision-makers.

If measures are taken along the lines of these companies' demands and the policies now in practice relaxed, it seems inevitable that the IMF limits would be strained and inflationary pressures increased. If deposit interest is lowered in one way or another in order to bring down credit interest, for example, it is felt that interest income will drop below the inflation rate and the flow of deposits to the banks, which has already slowed, will slow even further. Should this happen, it would obviously mean a concurrent revival of demands in various areas and heightened inflationary pressures.

It is pointed out, moreover, that bringing Central Bank resources into play for the purpose of supporting the banks and helping out the hard-pressed companies might have the same effect. It is felt that should the total limits so closely watched by the IMF be exceeded in allowing Central Bank resources to be used, it would damage another goal of the economic policy now being pursued, cutting back

on the credits being directed into exports and certain other preferred investments and making it more difficult to reach the projected goals in these areas.

There are also suggestions that the government's attitude toward these hard choices is important in setting the tone of the economic policies to be pursued in the period ahead, but that certain of the steps which may be taken to get over specific rough spots in the short term may not be long-lived and a path may be carved out depending on the course of events.

8349

CSO: 4654/388

IMPACT OF SOUTHERN ANATOLIA PROJECT OBSERVED

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 2-5 Jul 82

[Article in four installments by Kayhan Saglamer]

[2 Jul 82 p 7]

[Text] We are in Urfa, "the city of the prophets." Senior Construction Engineer Ismail Sarac says passionately: "GAP [Southeastern Anatolia Project] will add another country to Turkey."

Abuzer Dalbasi, another senior engineer from the State Hydraulic Affairs Directorate General [DSI], spurs our hopes:

"GAP will give Turkey the dignity and the position it has been striving for. We will dominate the world cotton market. People will listen to us on the wheat market. We will sell instead of buying electrical energy."

Huseyin Ozyavuz, a poor peasant from the parched Harran Plain, is impatient and anxious:

"Our crops are threatened by the drought. Relief will come either from God or the government." He means GAP.

What is GAP? Is it a magic stick that will cause miracles, or is it a nickname for the legendary savior? No, GAP is not something out of the next world; it is right here in this world. GAP means Southeastern Anatolia Project. It is a project with many parts. It is the most ambitious project Turkey has ever undertaken. It is the project over which [former Prime Minister Suleyman] Demirel "lost his sleep" and which led [Deputy Prime Minister Turgut] Ozal to say: "[GAP] is of vital importance to Turkey."

We went there, we touched it with our own hands and we saw it by our own eyes. The enormity of the project is hard to perceive without touching or seeing it. To give an idea of the size of the project, let us give you a generalized and simplified picture: GAP will more than cover Turkey's \$3-billion annual oil import bill. In other words, "Turkey has already found its petroleum source." The problem is getting it out. We have been talking about the "equivalence of a kilogram of wheat and a liter of petroleum." Now, we can comfortably promise our children, their children and the following generations that Turkey is rounding the corner of prosperity. Our successors will witness it, they will be proud of it and

they will share the prosperity it will bring. We will no longer have to beg for alms from abroad. They will come and asks us: "Give us this and that."

GAP will change the unpleasant destiny of the Anatolians. GAP consists of 12 giant projects which will cover the extensive fertile plains of the lower Euphrates and Tigris rivers. The project envisages the building of dams, hydroelectric power stations and irrigation canals as well as the installation and development of agricultural, transportation, industrial, educational, health and other services.

We went to have a look at the Ataturk Dam that is being built on the Euphrates river in the Bozova district of Urfa. Well-tended vineyards and pistachio groves appeared to be embracing each other. We were drawn into a chat with the inhabitants of Bozova over the tea they had offered us. We asked them:

"When the Ataturk Dam is completed, how long will it take to fill it with water?"

"In a week" said Mustafa Aksut, the Police Chief of Bozova, without thinking much. Another man objected:

"I would say it could be filled in one day."

I looked at my photographer colleague, Erkut Oğet, and we could not help smiling. The DSI had told us before our departure from Urfa that it would take $2\frac{1}{2}$ years to fill the dam--and that on condition that the Euphrates river would be completely cut off and not a single drop of water would pass to the other side of the dam. The DSI's GAP Regional Director Abuzer Dalbasi had told us: "That is when all hell will break loose."

Obstructions

The problem is as follows:

There is a popular rhyme among the people of Southeastern Anatolia: "Turkey urinates, and Syria and Iraq drink it." When we embarked upon making full use of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, our southern neighbors were worried that they would remain "without water." They were also afraid that Turkey could get too powerful and upset the balance in the Middle East, thus overshadowing their interests. So now they are trying to undermine the project, overtly or covertly. One tactic is to dissuade the World Bank and other sources of credit from financing GAP.

However, Dalbasli has faith. He almost begged us to rally public support for GAP. He said:

"This water is enough for them. They have nothing to worry about. Syria and Iraq are cutting the branch they are sitting on. The Middle East needs Turkey. We will be the bread basket and the food store of the Middle East. We will feed ourselves and the rest of the Middle East. Cutting off the Euphrates completely is out of the question. We will give Syria and Iraq as much water as they need. When we do that, it will take $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 years to fill the Ataturk Dam. The total capacity of the dam will be 48.7 billion cubic meters. That is a lot."

Fresh Hopes

The Ataturk Dam is a subunit of the largest--the "Lower Euphrates Project"--of the 12 giant projects comprising GAP. From almost every aspect, the Ataturk Dam will be one and a half times as big as the Keban Dam, currently the largest dam in Turkey. The rock-fill type dam is targeted for completion in 1990, although the contract has not yet been awarded.

The Dogus company has been awarded the contract to build the derivation tunnels for the dam for 5.5 billion Turkish liras. The work was started on 20 November 1981 and is expected to be completed on 20 November 1984. There will be three concrete tunnels, 8 meters in diameter and a total length of 1,089.6 meters. The tunnels will divert completely the flow of the Euphrates river through the mountains so that a foundation can be built for the Ataturk Dam. The embankments of the river will be built up to be used as two temporary dams, and later they will be joined with the main dam. In the future, the derivation tunnels will be used to siphon off the excess water from the Ataturk Dam.

Dogus' Site Manager Ismail Sarac's words filled us with fresh hopes:

"The hydroelectric power station at the Ataturk Dam will produce an average of 8.1 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually. The value of this energy as used for lighting is 56 billion Turkish liras in terms of prices charged by the Turkish Electric Power Enterprise. On a per-second use basis, this amount of energy will have a fivefold contribution to the national economy."

"The water to be accumulated behind the dam will be used to irrigate 730,000 hectares of land. In general, a transition from dry to wet farming means a net annual increase of 30,000 Turkish liras per hectare in yield. You can calculate for yourself what our total gain will be."

Sarac moved to private enterprise after working for the DSI. He showed us Dogus' well-stocked construction equipment park. He pointed to an incredibly large truck with a total load capacity of 50 metric tons and wheels measuring 2 meters in diameter. He said:

"Around 84.5 million cubic meters of rock and dirt will be used in building the body of the Ataturk Dam. These 50-ton trucks are too small; we need 200-ton trucks. Otherwise, we will have a traffic jam here similar to that of Istanbul. The problem is in finding the foreign currency we need to bring the heavy construction equipment. We need \$250 million for the Ataturk Dam alone."

[3 Jul 82 p 7]

[Text] According to legend, Adam set up his farm in the Harran Plain. We drove from Urfa toward the Syrian border on a straight and smooth road running along the seemingly endless Harran Plain. The soil around us was red and fertile. You could not find a single piece of rock. Neither is it possible to see a single tree or a drop of water. The plain is a semi-desert. MILLIYET's Urfa correspondent Omer Okutan said:

"In the summer, you can see mirages around here."

We toured the ruins of Harran, which has a 7000-year history. Two peasants, whose poverty could be read from their faces and attire, approached us shyly while we were touring the remnants of a fortress. Harran's name has been changed to Altinbasak and the district has been demoted to the subdistrict level. One of the peasants, Huseyin Ozyavuz, seemed worried. He knew we were journalists from the "Press" sign on our car. He asked:

"When will the Ataturk Dam be completed? You must know."

We tried to explain that it was targeted for completion in 1990. He added:

"The farmers are burning; they are dying. We have been wiped out. Our crops are doomed if it does not rain. The water from the Ataturk Dam will be our lifesaver. Our hopes are with God and the government. Our life is nothing but an ordeal. Our debts are crushing us."

Like other farmers in Altinbasak, Ozyavuz has sown wheat, barley and lentils. He said that they are using artificial fertilizer, but that it is too expensive for their means. He said that if it does not rain in time, the fertilizer will incinerate the crop on the soil. As a result, the soil is used for sowing one year and is fallowed the next. From the commanding view of the fortress, the Harran Plain looked like a red-and-green chessboard.

Rain Prayers

Ozyavuz's anxiety must not be taken lightly. When we noticed women making dried dung cakes among domed adobe houses, Ozyavuz said: "We have no other choice; we do not have enough money for coal." In other words, natural fertilizer is being used for fuel.

With adequate rainfall, the wheat yield may be as high as 15 to 1. Under drought conditions that number may fall to as low as 3 or 2 to 1. Ozyavuz said that sometimes they do not even bother to harvest the crop. When we were there, the rainfall was inadequate. Ozyavuz said that they had prayed for rain twice that season. We hope that their prayers have been answered. Otherwise, this is what Ozyavuz sadly said they would do:

"We will go with our families to Cukurova to work in the fields and to pick cotton. The searing heat and the malaria there makes us miserable. In the winter, we can set up tents outside Adana and work in the city. If we cannot find jobs, some of us will even beg in the streets. The rain and the mud in Adana is outrageous. In addition to all these, our children's education will be interrupted."

The Ataturk Dam will create a new Cukurova in Harran alone. The complete GAP will provide Turkey with twenty Cukurovas. This is no exaggeration. GAP is truly an amazing and awesome project.

Modern Ferhats

According to legend, Ferhat bore a hole through the mountain to bring water to his lover Sirin. How will the Ataturk Dam, now being built on the Euphrates river, bring water to the Harran Plain? It will use the same method Ferhat used: The famous Urfa tunnel.

The Urfa tunnel is a hole through the obstruction that separates the future lake behind the Ataturk Dam and the Harran Plain. The tunnel will direct the water behind the Ataturk Dam to 300,000 hectares of land which will flower with prosperity.

To perceive the enormous size of the Urfa tunnel we will make some comparisons.

The Istanbul subway is 550 meters long and has a diameter of 6.6 meters.

The Urfa tunnel will consist of two parallel ducts, each 26.4 kilometers long and running 40 meters away from each other. The concrete ducts will have a diameter of 7.62 meters. Each tunnel will carry 164 cubic meters of water per second. That is roughly half the flow capacity of the Euphrates river.

In other words, the Urfa tunnel is 100 times as long as the Istanbul subway we are so proud of. It will be the world's largest irrigation tunnel.

The contract for building the tunnel has been awarded to the Akpinar company for 26.93 billion Turkish liras--in 1981 prices--on condition that only Turkish resources will be used in the construction of the project. The target completion date is 1987. We toured the completed part of the tunnel by car. The impressive nature of the project and the intensity level of the work brought joy to our hearts. I had to hold on to my colleague, Erkut Oget, out of fear of falling. The Akpinar personnel and the DSI inspectors are working with fervor 150 to 240 meters underground, fully aware of their honorable duties. They have already completed 20 percent of the project.

"Paurat E-134," the tunnel boring machine with a drill head was very interesting. It looked like a monster with sharp teeth rather than a heavy piece of construction equipment. Because of its name, the workers call the machine "Avrat" [woman]. The natives of Urfa call it "the mole." We thought it deserved the name "Modern Ferhat." Our Renault easily passed the 30 to 40-ton trucks carrying the dirt dug up with deafening noise by "Modern Ferhat."

Land Speculation

In addition to the land to be irrigated by the Urfa tunnel, the Ataturk Dam will open up another 430,000 hectares of land to wet farming with the pumps that will operate with the electricity it will produce. These lands will cover the plains of Siverek, Hilvan, Baziki and Suruc. Since the transition from dry to wet farming will increase agricultural production by twentyfold, the Urfa tunnel will pay for itself in 5 years.

Let us return to the Harran Plain.

We visited Ozanlar, a dry-farming village. The villagers have already coined a name for Harran for when wet farming arrives: "Altinova" [Golden Plain]. When we were there, the villagers were smiling because they had just received some rainfall. However, they still could not grow anything except wheat, barley and lentils, just like the villagers of Harran Plain. The vegetables and fruit they can grow is barely enough for themselves.

We squatted with the villagers on rugs in Ibrahim Avci's house. We rested against pillows. We had taken off our shoes previously. While we were drinking our yogurt drinks, Avci said:

"Ozanlar is a village of poverty. There are people here who have not eaten meat for two months. When there is water, we have everything. When there is no water, we have nothing. If we get water, we can even grow citrus. We can work for ourselves instead of Adana."

The drought of 1973 was disastrous for the villagers. They could not harvest their crop and had to let their animals feed on the crop. The Ziraat Bankasi rescued them. It lent them money to be paid back in 3 years and donated seed and food so that they could live on. Even cool weather is considered a blessing here, let alone rain.

The promise of a steady supply of water has caused astronomical jumps in land prices here. Avci gave some examples:

"A piece of land selling for 7,000 Turkish liras per donum [1 hectare equals 100 donums] in Bugdaytepe last year was sold for 25,000 Turkish liras per donum this year. In Yakacik, the best plots of land sold for 8,000 to 9,000 Turkish liras per donum last year. This year, the worst plots are selling for 15,000 to 16,000 Turkish liras per donum."

Economic Feudal Lords

We moved from Ozanlar to Ugurlu. Imam Kahraman, the gregarious head of the village, said: "The truth is that the people's hope is in the sky and the Urfa tunnel." He added with a smile:

"If they permit us, we will work as volunteers for free to complete the Ataturk Dam and the Urfa tunnel faster."

On land speculation he said:

"Lands that would go begging for customers at 2,000 Turkish liras per donum are now selling for 20,000 Turkish liras per donum. There are buyers from Adana, Gaziantep and other neighboring provinces, but nobody is selling to speculators any more."

We believe that the government must not delay measures to prevent the proliferation of economic feudal lords.

[4 Jul 82 p 7]

[Text] Turkey is trying to shed its image of "the fool who watches the water flow by." The goal of GAP is to produce 22 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity each year and to open up 18 million donums of land to wet farming.

But will the problem be solved by bringing water to enormous tracts of fertile but dry land? Not really. Because our farmers do not know how to use the water they have not known. All they have learned from their ancestors and all they have done during their lifetime is dry farming.

The DSI is seeking to find a remedy to this problem at an enormous laboratory-type project in the Akcakale district of Urfa.

"Laboratory" is only a way of description. The real name of the operation is Akcakale Underground Water Project [AYSP]. Its goal is to irrigate 150,000 donums of the Harran Plain by drilling wells and pumping up the water. For the moment, only 75,000 donums have been opened up to wet farming through the use of 210 pumps.

The Director of the AYSP, Construction Engineer Fevzi Gencer, complained:

"When the peasant found the water he does not know, he lost his head. The cotton crop needs to be watered eight times a day. Since abundant water has been available, they have been watering their cotton crop 16 times a day killing the young shoots before they bear any fruit. They also do not know how to hoe the soil. In cotton growing hoeing is more important than watering. But they are learning fast. The pioneers of wet farming are being trained here."

Those Tied to Their Lands

We went to Onortaklar, a village opened up to wet farming by the AYSP. Young farmer Huseyin Eren joked:

"The DSI has burdened us with work. In the old days, we would plow the land, sow the seeds and go and sit in the coffeeshop in Urfa. We would go back at harvest time, mow the crop, sell whatever God had given us and come back and relax in Urfa. Now, we are breaking our backs working."

Then he got serious:

"The truth is that the water has tied us to our land."

The radical socioeconomic changes brought to Onortaklar by irrigation is a microcosm of what will happen in Southeastern Anatolia in the future. Three enterprising brothers have jumped from the moldiness of fatalism to the creativity of science and technology and are now farming a 3,000-donum plot of land. All three are university graduates: Huseyin is a graduate of Adana's Higher Institute of Engineering, Ibrahim is a graduate of Ankara's Higher Institute of Journalism and Halil has graduated from the Izmir School of Economics.

There is more. A School of Agriculture was opened in Urfa 2 years ago within the framework of GAP to meet the expected demand for technical personnel. The

Eren brothers' sister is a sophomore there. Huseyin said: "But she does not want to work with us. She wants to guide our farmers as a government employee."

Southeastern Anatolia is moving.

We asked the Eren brothers what the water brought with it. They replied:

"Fallowing is no longer practiced. The wheat yield has climbed from 5-10 to 1 to 30-40 to 1. We are now able to use artificial fertilizers. If the farmers are properly trained and if we can find better quality seeds, the yield will increase even more. We are no longer the slaves of wheat, barley and lentils. Now we can grow all types of cereals, vegetables and fruits. The migration to the big cities has stopped. As a matter of fact, those who had migrated before the arrival of the water are returning to their lands and villages. For example, if there was no water, all three of us would be looking for work in Istanbul, Ankara or some other big city. And if we could not find work, we would join the ranks of the degreed unemployed.

"Soon, we will be harvesting two or three crops a year, just like in Cukurova. For example, as soon as we harvest the wheat we will sow soybeans. We will also take up grazing. Right now we are still in the toddling stage. When we really start moving we expect to increase our crop yield by seven times."

The power of water seems awesome. We went out and toured the fields and the groves. We stood before a case of seedlings. One of the Eren brothers said:

"Strawberries. We will be growing strawberries for the first time ever. We never had the chance to have strawberries before. Soon all our villagers in the plains will be able to have plenty of strawberries."

Then they pointed to the laborers in the distance working with their picks and hoes:

"These laborers come from villages which still practice dry farming. They are seasonal laborers. They are coming here instead of Adana to make a living. They learned using picks and hoes here. Picks and hoes are unnecessary in dry farming. They were used in construction sites only."

Next, we moved to Gozdegmez, another village which could make the transition from dry to wet farming thanks to AYSP. On the way, AYSP Agricultural Engineer Mehmet Mujde pointed to the difference between wheat fields employing dry farming and those using wet farming. The difference is spectacular. The crop on one is short and sparse. On the other one, the crop is knee-high and dark green. We were told that the pistachio tree bears fruit in 15 years without irrigation and in 7 years with irrigation.

Our chat with the villagers of Gozdegmez began with a word of thanks from Halef Acar: "Water is life. We were deeply in debt to Ziraat Bankasi. Now we have paid all our debts. May God bless the DSI." They looked excited. They had sown cotton for the first time, and they were wondering what would spring from the fertile soil.

None of the villagers knew anything about cotton, which needs care and experience. How did they manage it? We were told that in Suruc, another district of Urfa, cotton was widely grown thanks to water from underground wells. Many farmers in Suruc were forced to abandon cotton farming when the water began to run low. So they came to Akcakale and proposed:

"You put up the land and we will put up our knowhow and labor. We will be partners."

Mutual interests have produced a harmonious partnership.

Nominal Fee

Halef Acar told us about a new problem:

"Raising animals has become a problem. With wet farming access to grazing grounds was restricted. We no longer can graze our animals for free. We have to keep them in barns. Though, I must admit that now, for the first time ever, we can grow fodder for the animals thanks to the water, and that is alleviating our problem."

We returned to Akcakale from the villages. This district used to be a major smuggling center. Now the smugglers have been wiped out. With the lawful means of earning a living the water has provided, the people have turned their backs on risky dealings. Of course, the discipline brought by the 12 September regime must not be underestimated.

AYSP Director Fevzi Gencer was happy to hear us tell him that "the farmers are thankful for his organization's efforts." He recalled the first water well they had drilled:

"The water began flowing abundantly as soon as we turned on the pump. But no puddles would form. The soil had been without water for centuries, and it could not satisfy its thirst. It took hours before a puddle could form.

"We can find water at depths of 150 to 250 meters. Pumping from a well is the world's toughest and most expensive method of getting water. Apart from labor costs, each cubic meter of water costs us 4 Turkish liras. But each season we charge the farmers a nominal fee per donum depending on his crop. As I said, our goal is to train the farmer in wet farming and to increase productivity."

[5 Jul 82 p 7]

[Text] One of the men complained angrily:

"They killed us while we are alive."

The other man was relatively quiet. He talked with a hissing voice: "When the government builds something, it destroys something else. Urfa's bottom will be turned into paradise, while we, at the top, will drown in the water."

This is the other side of the GAP coin which we have been praising so vehemently. Yes, several population centers where a total of 50,000 people live will be covered by the waters of the lake that will form behind the Ataturk Dam. We first went to Samsat, a district of Adiyaman by the Euphrates river and one of the first settlements to be erased from the map. The unkempt village has a maximum of 5 years to live. It has a population of 2,200. We listened to villagers who were wondering with anxiety about their unknown fate.

The government has abandoned Samsat since it is part of the "Ataturk Dam region." For years, not a single penny has been spent on the village. What is worse, the government remains silent about what is to be done in the future. No one knows whether the settlement will be moved elsewhere, whether the houses, the shops, the fields and the groves will be nationalized and whether those who have not saved for the future will receive any support from the government.

'Money Disappears Fast'

We listened to Bedir Ada:

"From the moment they started talking about the Ataturk Dam, not a thing has been built in Samsat. Otherwise, we would have grown to five times our size. We have building lots, but we cannot build houses on them. We cannot repair our houses. We cannot buy new tractors."

Haci Yusuf Polat interjected:

"I was born and raised in Samsat. I rent my house. My son and daughter also rented their house after they were married. Half the people of Samsat are renting their houses. Five people sleep in the same room. If they give us money and building lots at wherever we are going to move, we can start building our houses now, and we will be saved from fearing the future."

The wealthy villagers have already guaranteed their future. They have bought houses in nearby towns like Urfa and Adiyaman. Now, they are renting those houses and staying in Samsat until the Ataturk Dam lake starts filling up. Some of them have even started factories in the neighboring towns.

The poor, on the other hand, have no security. Most of them want land. Bedir Ada said:

"Money disappears fast. We have no skills. If they give us a small plot of land, we can work and eke out a living."

We would also tend to condemn the government. The road between Samsat and Adiyaman was also left to its fate for the same inconsistent reason. The road was filled with potholes. A large piece of rock thrown in the air by a truck coming in the opposite direction broke the windshield of our car. We had a hard time until we reached Adiyaman. We had to pay 6,000 Turkish liras to repair the windshield. Crossing the Euphrates on a primitive raft--which the local people call a "ship"--was another miserable experience. All in all, it was a tough journey.

Our sympathy for our 50,000 citizens in the Ataturk Dam region was deepened when, on our return to Istanbul, we heard on the radio that the government had started work, with the help of the British, to save ancient ruins and archaeological artifacts that will be endangered by the lake to form behind the Ataturk Dam.

Fishing Villages

The Ataturk Dam will change the social fabric as well as the geography of Southeastern Anatolia. Ancient steppe settlements will be transformed into fishing villages. For example, Urfa's Bozova district, population 10,000, will, one morning, wake up and find itself by the shores of the lake behind the Ataturk Dam.

We discussed with the villagers of Bozova the changes that will come with the transformation of their village into a lakeshore settlement. They said: "We can become fishermen." Are there fish in the Euphrates? Police Chief Mustafa Aksut replied:

"There are lots of fish. Each one maybe weighs 1,000 kilograms. They have to load the fish on camels to bring them here. These fish have two heads. The butchers cut the fish as they cut up the carcass of an ox, and then they sell the meat."

Of course, there are no fish with two heads. We later learned that one of the heads is the tail of the fish. If you divide Aksut's 1,000 kilograms by 10, you can have an idea about the true weight of the fish called "farha." We were told that the butchers cure the skin of the fish, dry it and use it for making drum-type instruments. The fish is said to be long and slender. We were also told that there is an abundant supply of other fish called "kupe," "sure" and "karaca."

We wanted to have a picture of the fish, but we were told that it was not in season. The fish are abundant when the waters of the Euphrates are low. The fish are caught by nets. We inquired if there was a better known name for the fish, but no one knew.

Socioeconomic Upheaval

Thinking about the socioeconomic upheaval that GAP will bring makes one dizzy. The migration trend from rural to urban areas will be reversed. Around 300,000 inhabitants of Southeastern Anatolia who have abandoned their homes in search of a better life are expected to return to their lands gradually as GAP nears completion.

The employment capacity of big cities like Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and Adana has already been exceeded. The employment opportunities to be created by GAP--particularly in the fields of energy production and agriculture--will trigger a flood of skilled and unskilled workers and professionals from various regions of the country to Southeastern Anatolia.

Of course, there will be some unexpected byproducts. For example, not a single bar existed in Elazig before the construction of the Keban Dam. After the

completion of the project, 13 bars mushroomed around the town.

GAP will also bring with it a host of questions:

--How will the need for technical staff be met?

--We said "GAP will add another country Turkey." How will the additional production be marketed?


--How will the need for rail, land and air transportation be met?

--Who will teach the farmers about wet farming?

--What are we going to do with the 22 billion kilowatt-hours of energy that will be produced each year?

--Who will plan an agriculture-based industry?

As you see, GAP is an integrated project that requires the contribution of all government ministries. If a coordinated effort is not made today, GAP may not produce what is expected from it.



[Caption] When completed, GAP will open 18 million donums of land to wet farming

Key:

1. Ataturk Dam
2. Euphrates River
3. Tigris River
4. Irrigation project

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CSO: 4654/380

STALINIST CP ORGAN EXAMINES KOIVISTO'S RECORD AS PRESIDENT

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 1 Jul 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Appearances As a Game"]

[Text] The discussion over the end of the Kekkonen era and the beginning of the Koivisto era is not merely an occurrence associated with the dearth of political issues during the summer; rather there is a firm political basis for it. What is at issue is the adjusting of the start of President Mauno Koivisto's career as a statesman in accordance with those demands on him which the record support he received in the presidential elections presuppose.

The overwhelming election victory does not for a moment permit a fading of his image; rather a new image, a new position, the start of a new era and a new course of action now remain to be seen and demonstrated in all clarity in as many matters as possible.

The presentation of family relations in a royal light, the particular success of state visits and the building of relations in all directions by the current president, unaided, not merely on the basis of what he has inherited and so forth, are now the appropriate materials for the foreign policy game.

As such, there is nothing wrong with all this. What subjects this bustling about to criticism is the fact that in one way or another emphasizes and nuances whose political content is no longer at all necessarily positive in every respect are associated with it.

We cannot avoid getting the impression that, for example, the supposed lack of freedom during President Kekkonen's term of office and the increase in political freedom now during Koivisto's term are playing up relations with the East in a certain light which those who are not very happy with those relations want those relations to appear in.

A constrained political climate is supposedly equated with close relations with the East, whereas a free political climate is identified with looser relations with the East and a particularly strong Western orientation. This has actually been at the heart of the discussion during presidents' terms in office, although it is only natural and understandable for the current president not to want such a confrontation. But there are those who do want it. Nor do they much

care about the fact that President Koivisto has himself on many occasions emphasized that President Kekkonen has relinquished the care and development of his foreign policy legacy.

People became familiar with the Koivisto image as the landslide vote directed at Koivisto during the presidential elections. Now they want to prolong that image by changing it into a Koivisto foreign policy image. Without painting an old bugaboo on the wall, we must, nevertheless confirm the fact that certain signs can be noted of the gradual beginnings of a battle over Finnish foreign policy. The ghosts of the past are beginning to haunt us. And those bugaboos will not stop at merely haunting us.

11,466
CSO: 3107/147

PROFESSOR EXAMINES 'KEKKONEN, KOIVISTO MYTHS'

Helsinki SUOMEN KUVALEHTI in Finnish 24 Jun 82 p 23

[Article by Prof Pertti Hemanus: "Kekkonen and Koivisto Myths"]

[Text] In the opinion of some people, this country's spiritual climate has been somehow decisively liberated with the change of presidents. Is this true? Did Urho Kekkonen suppress criticism directed against himself? Was he not, just the opposite, our most criticized president and was he, therefore, not something quite different from being a suppressor of criticism?

Aside from being a public official, every statesman and leading politician is also a person, a human being. Myths that have at least in part been derived from the truth itself in terms of content but which have gradually strayed farther from it and begun to lead lives of their own spring up about every statesman and leading politician. In these myths the public official and the person get tangled up in one another.

These statements probably contain self-evident truths; however, I wanted to bring them to mind for the sake of being sure. As a "Kekkonen man" myself, I am ready to admit that a Kekkonen myth has existed among the Finnish public for a long time now, one that has obviously strayed from the truth. Urho Kaleva Kekkonen seemed, for example, to defy the laws of biology: our earlier 70-year-old and then later even 75-year-old president who had the physical condition of a 40-year-old. Let the doctors answer the question whether such a thing is at all possible.

To those who blindly believed in the Kekkonen myth the old president's illness and renunciation of his duties must have been a shock. Their shock would be even greater if they dared to read Penti Sainio's book, "What Happened to Urho Kekkonen," according to which Kekkonen's serious illness by no means appeared just last year, but years before. At least Eino S. Repo has indeed disputed Sainio's information and I will not presume to take a stand on which of the two is closer to the truth, Sainio or Repo. If Sainio is even moderately right, let those who consistently uphold a misleading picture of the state of the president's health take stock of themselves. What miracle did they think they would achieve by doing so?

Is "Hukkaputki" the Measure of All Things?

I am of a mind to give way to speculation.

Along with others, I think that those who created and preserved that too rigidly kindled myth are in some way morally responsible for the thumping shattering of the Kekkonen myth that has taken place. The intensity [of feeling] could not and did not last.

Is the shattering of the Kekkonen myth, therefore, merely a welcome step in the direction of honesty, realism and objectivity? No. If there were criticizable features in the myth itself, there are many more involved in its shattering.

Precisely in reading Sainio, something inside of me was unwilling [to accept his argument]. While everything he said is correct, these statements could mislead the reader who does not have the proper perspective and a more thorough basic knowledge and conception of the situation. I will borrow a perceptive statement from the former head of the President's Office, Antero Jyranki (PIKAJUNA 12/1982): "The significance of President Kekkonen's 25-year achievement cannot be dimmed by the events of a year or two. If this should happen, it would clearly be an optical illusion."

Whether I sound like an old uncle or not, I wonder how many of today's young people really understand the significance of Kekkonen's lifetime achievement in the field of foreign policy. My own generation — which vaguely remembers even the outbreak of the Winter War — is, however, in a different position.

I am bewildered by the claims that the climate of discussion or the climate in general in Finland has been decisively liberated since Kekkonen's retirement from office. What does this mean?

Did Kekkonen prevent the news media from criticizing him and his use of power through some secret means? Did not, for example, the HELSINGIN SANOMAT supposedly criticize the president whenever it wanted to, at times even in an especially demonstrative way? Did this result in any fateful consequences for that newspaper?

And did the so-called "mill letters" — in themselves an exceptional way of using power — produce a magical effect? Did not some recipients of these letters submit but did not others, on the other hand, defy the wishes of the man who sent them?

It cannot be denied that Kekkonen made maximal use of his power within the limits permitted by the nation's laws. But was he not also criticized for this, even on occasion unreasonably so? Has not Kekkonen been our most criticized president to date? If this is so, how then can we talk of a constrained climate that prevailed during his term of office as president?

I will admit one thing: Also during his term of office as president, Television Channel One's in itself incomparable "Hukkaputki" has done sketches on

Mauno Koivisto which it would not have done on Urho Kekkonen. But, after all, is "Hukkaputki" the measure of all things?

I think that between 1956 and 1981 the public climate in Finland changed constantly, while the president remained the same. These changes could, therefore, not have decisively depended on the president.

On a Pedestal Before His Time

The creation of a Koivisto myth is linked with the shattering of the Kekkonen myth. I think that a president who is presumed to be doing his job well has sympathetic and broad support among us. There is not yet anything mythical about saying this.

But even now putting Koivisto on a pedestal is another matter. The methods used to do so are unfounded comparisons, just like the talk about liberating the climate [of opinion]. Premature conclusions belong to the same category. In its editorial (2 June 1982) the Social Democratic KANSAN LEHTI among other things wrote — referring to the president — that "so far not a single row has been raised over appointment policy nor has a decision been interpreted as being wrong." In response to this, we may point out that at the time this was printed the length of Koivisto's term in office was 1/75th (!) of that of Kekkonen's. Besides, an appointment decision that "is interpreted as being wrong" may in the end prove itself to be very right.

So, when myths are shattered, new ones are simultaneously created. The ideal situation would probably be a life without myths but mankind has so far not come anywhere near reaching that level.

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CSO: 3107/147

STALINIST ORGAN ON EARLY ELECTION RUMORS

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 29 Jun 82 p 2

[Editorial: "The Elections"]

[Text] Lately, before the onset of summer, there was a lot of talk about early elections. They would be held as early as the fall or right at the end of the fall, whereas elections are normally held in March.

Prime Minister Sorsa has taken note of this identification with that time of year and feels that the organization of early elections is unnecessary. But President Koivisto's view, according to which early elections would primarily be political idiocy, carries even more weight in this matter than Sorsa's.

This view is based on the fact that early elections would indicate that the president's election had created an exceptional state of affairs in the country, one which the new president, who has announced that he will continue to follow the former policy line, would certainly not be happy with.

Judging from everything that has happened, there will be no early elections. While the Social Democrats want the elections to be gotten out of the way, the TES [expansion unknown] decision, which is bad for the workers, the general significance of the elections for the Social Democrats turns out to be more important in terms of deciding when to hold elections; that is, the question is what kind of resources will be set in motion for the "new era" with the new president. Special elections would not provide a good image. For this reason we must conclude that there will be no early elections. But let's wait and see.

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CSO: 3107/147

LIBERAL PARTY YOUTH GROUP ESTABLISHES NEW ORGANIZATION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 5 Jul 82 p 12

[Text] Turku (HS)—Badly split, the Liberal Youth League (LNL) is continuing its activity in the LKP [Liberal Party], which has moved into the fold of the Center Party. Almost the entire leadership of the LNL, which opposed the party merger, separated from both the LNL and the LKP at the LNL congress held in Eura at the end of the week.

Those who separated from the LNL took with them the Liberal Student Union. At the end of the week the student union received a new name and those who have left the LNL intend to continue their activities in the rechristened organization.

The LNL leadership had already beforehand clearly said no to the Center Party-LKP merger. Those who advocated that the LNL separate from the LKP mother party, however, clearly remained a minority at the Eura special congress.

In a straw vote about 40 of the 60 congress delegates supported the LNL's remaining in the LKP. According to those who remained in the minority, the congress delegates were pressured by the party into keeping the LNL affiliated with the party.

As a result of the decision, among others, LNL chairman Harri Ruohomaki, LNL Executive Committee chairman Lauri Itanen and first secretary Helena Inkinen resigned. Furthermore, the whole four-man LNL Executive Committee left. Only four of the 15 LNL administration members will probably stay on.

The LNL will be run under the leadership of vicechairman Raili Jaatinen until the regular congress is organized next October.

The Liberal Student Union met in Eura immediately after the LNL congress. The union decided to separate from the LKP and at the same time adopt the new name of Radical Youth and Student Organization.

Harri Ruohomaki, who has left the LNL, will become chairman of the organization. According to Ruohomaki, the organization will continue to exist independently of the parties and function as one of the alternative movements.

There are about 5,000 members in the LNL and a couple of thousand in the student union.

CONSERVATIVE LEADERS WEIGH CHOICES: COALITION OR OPPOSITION

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 13 Jun 82 pp 14-15

[Article by Petri Ahoniemi: "What Is Our Alternative?"]

[Text] The Conservative Party has already now begun an election campaign with an eye on the forthcoming parliamentary elections. The party has been in opposition for more than 16 years. If it enters the government, what will it have to offer as an alternative to present policy?

Is the Conservative Party presently only a toothless seal or does the lion in the party's coat of arms roar just as loudly as it did in the 1970's? Is the party only a mere morsel for Sorsa, the Social Democrats, and the government?

"The Conservative Party's opposition policy has become softer," states one of the former key figures in the Conservative Party's opposition policy, Lohi Mayor Raimo Ilaskivi, but understands.

"One cannot make mistakes in opposition," states MP Jouni J. Sarkijarvi and also understands a "pacified Conservative Party".

"The Social Democrats and the Conservative Party have come closer to each other. However, there are many differences of opinion," states another Conservative Party MP, Pertti Salolainen. He also understands. Future partners in cooperation must not be made angry...

"The Conservative Party has become more mellow and older. Fortunately, its rightwing nature has disappeared," states Youth Secretary Pasi Natri.

"And we are not sitting in the government with one leg, but are offering a responsible alternative," answers Chairman Ilkka Suominen.

"This is a kind of prelude to the parliamentary elections, a warming-up tour," states Conservative Party Secretary Jussi Isotalo while sitting at the wheel of the car. The end of the day's journey is Kouvola, the next stop for the Conservative Party's message.

Chairman Ilkka Suominen sits next to Party Secretary Isotalo. They make up the vanguard of the tour, which will travel for almost 2 weeks throughout sum-

mer Finland from the snows of Rovaniemi to the sleety rains of Southern Finland. And entertainment is being provided by Fredi & The Black Angels as well as Eeva-Riitta Siitonens as the leader.

"One of the main themes of the parliamentary elections will be the Conservative Party. To the greatest extent possible they will be government elections," predicts the team.

The Conservative Party has been in opposition for the last 16 years. During this period in opposition it has nearly doubled its constituency. But perhaps within a year already there will be Conservative Party members in the cabinet. And if this does not happen?

"Indeed, this can be thrown back by asking whether 700,000 can continually be excluded from the government," answers Ilkka Suominen.

"However, no formal wrongdoing would have been committed in this if this were to happen. No punishment has been determined for this in the criminal code. If we should have an election victory, a bourgeois majority would be retained in the parliament, and if nothing changes, it only indicates that the will of the people has no effect in our democracy," states Suominen.

"Urho Kekkonen once defended the entry of the Communists into the government by the fact that one-fifth of the people could not be continually kept on the sidelines. The same now holds true for one-fourth," states Isotalo.

"Most Important Responsibility Lies With Center Party"

Most recently a month ago Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa (Social Democrat) placed the blame for the Conservative Party being in opposition primarily on the Center Party. Sorsa considers that the Center Party made a decision in principle in first choosing the leftwing rather than the Conservative Party. A week before Chairman Paavo Vayrynen (Center Party) announced that it is they who have been demanding that the Conservative Party be included in the government, but since the Social Democrats do not want this ...

Similar accusations have been made for years already. Ilkka Suominen considers that Sorsa is correct in this assessment and Vayrynen is wrong.

"I would emphasize the fact that after the elections the major part of the responsibility and choice will be with the Center Party. The SDP will still be able to reject government cooperation with us on the basis of ideological premises.

"If the Social Democrats do this, the Center Party will either have to choose a bourgeois majority government or the present government base," states Suominen.

Chairman Suominen points out that even the present government is not actually a broad-based government in the sense that it has more than two-thirds of

parliamentary support behind it. If the minority Communists are excluded, the government is supported by 123 MP's.

"Then it is all the same whether the government is supported by 130 or 101 MP's," states Suominen.

After the elections a bourgeois majority government could be just as effective or even more effective than the present government. In the opinion of the Conservatives the SDP could also be in opposition since it is not irreplaceable.

"We will strive for a broad-based government, but if this does not occur, there must be an opportunity to form a bourgeois majority government. If this opportunity is denied, it would be the same as saying that the SDP is irreplaceable," states Suominen.

Suominen states that he was amazed by the statement made a week ago by Swedish People's Party Chairman Par Stenback. Stenback doubted the ability of a bourgeois majority government to function as if recognizing the existence of a Social Democratic hegemony.

"If one can draw a conclusion from Stenback's statement and also partially from Vayrynen's statements, then in their opinion the SDP would belong in all governments. Stated in this way a position of hegemony has already been given to the Social Democrats," states Suominen and considers that the granting of such concessions is nearly the same as giving the SDP the keys to extortion: "If you do not do as we want, we will leave the government. You have stated that you cannot get along without us."

In the opinion of Suominen and Isotalo there should be a bourgeois alternative in the country.

"And it must also be used. This ensures that the SDP will not occupy a position of hegemony."

"SDP Has Turned to the Right"

In the 1970's the Conservative Party declared itself the chief opponent of the SDP. Criticism was still sharp, but what "bad" does the leadership of the Conservative Party see in the SDP today?

"Today's SDP is a tactical structure. The background still conceals the old programs, which have not been changed. They still contain demands for the socialization of the banks, insurance companies, and so on and the monopolization of communications.

"They are still striving toward a centralized economic system within a Finnish framework. These goals have not been changed," states Suominen.

"The only issue which they brought up last winter was the demand to monopolize communications. And even this apparently by accident," presumes Isotalo.

When themes for the next parliamentary elections have been deliberated within the leadership of the SDP, certain comrades have demanded the elimination of the blue color from declarations and advertisements, which was included during the presidential elections. Red should be restored to its previous place of honor. The majority was strictly opposed to the restoration of the color red to a place of honor. Instead, the party's trademark, the red rose, is receiving less and less emphasis.

This is a very graphic example of the SDP's present populist atmosphere.

"Old, Honest Sorsa"

"The moderate rightwing direction of citizens, appreciation of the orientation toward the individual, and social and economic realities have forced the Social Democrats into bourgeois waters," states Suominen.

"The present-day SDP as an excessively reactionary party would not fit into the same government with the SDP of the latter 1960's," states Isotalo.

"In the years 1970--1975 the Conservative Party came closer to the SDP, but since then the SDP has come closer to us. And, of course, this does not grieve us," states Suominen.

"Except, of course, if Suominen were not the chairman of the country's largest bourgeois party and Kalevi Sorsa..."

Suominen states that this trend increases the opportunities for cooperation, but there are still many differences between the Conservative Party and the Social Democratic Party. For example, the taxation policy is one issue in which differences can be found. The SDP will not even consent to discuss the postponement of a value added tax system, which the Conservative Party has demanded for a long time.

On the other hand, Suominen has the following to say about Kalevi Sorsa's previous "softer role":

"If one scratches the surface a little, then one can find the old Sorsa."

"I Love This Country"

The chilly Hansa Center in Kouvola at noon on Thursday: approximately 600 residents of Kouvola have come to listen and see Fredi's orchestra, which is spread out on the stage. In his first song Fredi swears that he loves this country.

After a couple songs Party Secretary Isotalo ascends to the stage and states hopefully that this may be the first occasion during the tour that it has not rained. The main points of the 7-minute speech are the Conservative Party's opposition stance, the forthcoming elections, the fact that the party represents a cross section of all the Finnish people, is the largest white-collar party, the second largest rural party, the third largest workers' party, and the largest party of entrepreneurs.

"We are on our way to elections which will be held next March at the latest. These elections will also determine who will be in power in the government. For the last 16 years nearly the same parties and in part even the same individuals have been in power. This framework directed from above is now in need of a change of direction. We will not be bringing into the government a machinery labelled Conservative Party, but labelled every fourth Finnish voter," declared Isotalo.

Then a few more songs from Fredi and after that it is Suominen's turn. Iso-talo's mentioned rain begins. For 10 minutes Suominen talks about increasing the opportunities of individuals to exert an influence in society while emphasizing his party's proximity to the people. The main theme today is reduced taxes for wage earners. He urges the SDP to answer whether it is ready to do this.

A questionnaire distributed to the people in the square is collected. Among other things, they are asked their opinion on the most suitable government base and greetings are expressed to the party leadership. Banners proclaim statements on issue concerning pensions, family matters, and emphasis on a strict policy line ('Restore Order to Finland').

There were also genial greetings when they were in Rovaniemi, one questionnaire contained the following greeting to a certain Conservative Party MP from a Lapp girl: "Did the scarf keep you warm?"

From Kouvola the journey continues to an evening function in Lahti. The same 45-minute routine is repeated. One-fourth of the people cannot can continually be kept in opposition... There are 9 months left until March. The seeds must be sown now. It is expected that there will be a great election victory in March.

Sarkijarvi Promises Tenacity

As Suominen and Isotalo press ahead in the field, Conservative Party MP Jouni J. Sarkijarvi is deliberating the essence of his party in the parliament from the point of view of a faction whip. Since the duties of a whip include making the faction's MP's perform their job in the chambers...

"The country needs this since otherwise the term opposition is meaningless. The opposition has much less favorable opportunities to influence the decisionmaking process," argues Sarkijarvi and continues by stating that in opposition there is no room for error.

Sarkijarvi criticized the present government base by stating that it has aspired to expand government interference in private business, increased bureaucracy, shackled local self-government, eliminated small businesses, rental housing, and so on.

"The Conservative Party would not become caught up in believing in the same slogans as the left: largeness, homogeneity, centralization," states Sarkijarvi.

In Sarkijarvi's opinion nothing would change overnight even if the Conservative Party were to enter the government. In his opinion we should reach a point in which the effect of decisions even over a 15-year period would be considered.

"Over such a period of time the inclusion of the Conservative Party in the government would mean an increase in small and medium-size businesses, which would significantly improve the level of services, among other things. Local self-government would increase, they would not have to make 'stupid decisions' because of directives from the state.

"As far as taxes are concerned, it is doubtful that the state would transfer revenue for the use of any more state enterprises than at the present time," states Sarkijarvi.

In addition, according to Sarkivarvi there would also be an increase in the protection of individual rights, a tax reform or 'at least its rationalization', and so on.

MP Jouni J. Sarkijarvi considers that the Conservative Party's opposition policy has become more moderate.

"In the beginning of the 1970's the parties had much greater differences with each other. At that time it was possible to find room outside of the mainstream. Now even in the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] they are about to consider the abandonment of socialism," states Sarkijarvi. In his opinion there are already now four large 'center parties' in Finland; the SDP, the SKDL, the Center Party, and the Conservative Party.

"Conservative Party's Alarm -- The Beginning of Government Wisdom"

MP Pertti Salolainen, chairman of the Finance Committee, is one of those Conservatives who has gone the furthest as a 'broker of power' not actually in the government, but, nevertheless, as the chairman of an important committee.

"In economic policy the Conservative Party's alarm has been the beginning of wisdom for the government. The SDP and the Center Party have changed their policies significantly since the beginning of the 1970's. The SDP has become more favorable to business," admits Salolainen, but: business tax reform in Salolainen's opinion has not yet been carried out to the extent that it should be, the tax burden is still too heavily weighted on the incomes of households.

"And taxes are rising again."

As a former editor, Salolainen sees differences in the press and communications policy as important.

"The SDP's aspiration is to monopolize the Finnish communications policy. We see this as a question of freedom of speech. The state-owned Finnish Broadcasting Corporation will monopolize radio and television for itself."

Salolainen proposes the commencement of local radio operations in Finland, its deregulation within the framework of agreed upon rules. He makes reference to France where organization-based local radio stations received operating licenses after Mitterrand came into power...

When the Constitutional Committee justified the monopoly position of the Finnish Broadcasting Corporation, it proposed two arguments: radio operations would be too expensive for private individuals and there would be too few channels to distribute. These arguments no longer hold true today," states Salolainen.

Salolainen would not want to place the SDP and the Center Party in different positions as partners in cooperation. We must learn to work with both and being in the same government with them would be the 'best solution'. Contrary to what Suominen says, he has the following to say about a bourgeois government:

"I do not believe that to be a long-term solution. It would cause unrest in the country. It can be used as a short-term solution so that the Social Democrats would not become too self-sufficient."

"Possibility of Cooperation With Social Democrats Is Disturbing"

Even though Conservative Party youth have frequently been 'accused' of leaning too far to the left, they have not been enchanted with the possibility of cooperation with the SDP. A strong Conservative Party--Center Party axis would be more suitable for them.

"The possibility of cooperation with the Social Democrats is disturbing in the sense that our ideological discussions in the 1970's severely criticized the SDP, in particular," admits First Secretary Pasi Natri of the Conservative Party Youth League.

"The Conservative Party has changed for the better in the sense that its right-wing trend has disappeared, but in its moderation it has become a party that has adopted a social-bureaucratic view of society rather than that of a party that emphasizes the individual," criticized Natri.

"On the other hand, the Social Democrats have moved in the other direction. Society no longer has any alternatives. There is only a 5--10-percent margin in which it is possible to act, it is believed that everything will automatically move forward. The Conservative Party has become more moderate, older, and has forgotten its depth," regrets Natri.

"Now there prevails the idea that Finnish society cannot be influenced. We must get rid of this kind of thinking. The individual must be able to have better opportunities for influencing his own living environment."

First Secretary Natri does not consider the accumulation of work and economic well-being to be an inherent value. Work is only a tool by which a person is able to realize himself.

"Beyond that, work has no significance. I cannot approve of the Christian-Marxist work ethic," states Natri.

Natri considers that the Conservative Party's entry into the government will not bring about any dramatic changes overnight. It is a question of the forms of rule, placing issues and problems in their proper order of priority.

"The present government does not take up important problems, but deals with mutual conflicts," states Natri and inquires about alleviating the housing problem for youth as an example.

Backbone of Socialism

The director of the City of Helsinki, Lord Mayor Raimo Ilaskivi, was one of the more visible key figures in the Conservative Party's opposition policy in the beginning of the 1970's. Now when Lord Mayor Ilaskivi looks out the window of his office, 'the best view in Helsinki', he states that the nature of the Conservative Party's opposition policy has become more moderate.

"An opposition policy is formed according to the prevailing factors, how the government was formed, what is the government's program, and to a certain degree it also depends on the personality of opposition leaders," states Ilaskivi.

"If one looks at the situation objectively as to whether the Conservative Party's policy is now different than it was at the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's, certain differences are apparent. At that time we were experiencing a phase in which the government proposed the EEC-agreement's protective laws to the parliament, among other things," states Ilaskivi. At that time according to Ilaskivi demands arose within the Conservative Party that the party should not be 'the government's silent partner' in all issues.

Lord Mayor Ilaskivi says that in the 1970's more hard-line stances were taken, but in moving into the 1980's the Conservative Party was already so big that a hard 'one-sided policy' was not wise.

"If this is done, the other side will crumble. This problem has been in existence since the establishment of the Finnish Christian League. It could have been a part of the Conservative Party and the party would now be even bigger," estimates Ilaskivi.

"The Conservative Party is now so close to being a ruling party that it must build bridges and not offend future partners in cooperation," says Ilaskivi of the present Conservative Party policy.

Ilaskivi considers that the differences between the Conservative Party and the SDP are ideological. In spite of this, the parties are potential partners in cooperation, emphasizes Ilaskivi.

The contrasts will appear in questions as to whether we should trust in the guardianship role of the state or give private business more room for movement in the wage earning sector as well as in industry.

"The backbone of socialism has been in the Social Democrats' closet for so long that it will remain there."

Ilaskivi believes that the entry of the Conservative Party into the government will strengthen people's faith in the profitability of enterprise.

"However, people have economic well-being as a motive. After a period of certain radicalism people do, however, move ahead in their lives, want a bigger house, a color TV instead of a black and white TV, and so on. People want an opportunity to work, to try, and to receive a reasonable compensation for their efforts," states Ilaskivi.

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CSO: 3107/146

CHRISTIAN PARTY CONGRESS SEES DANGER IN MERGER WITH CENTER

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Jun 82 p 6

[Article by Esa Valiverronen: "Christian League Changes Leadership"]

[Excerpt] Oulu--The direction of the party leadership toward the center has not caused very much grumbling among the rank and file of the Christian League. A large number of representatives to the congress still seem to be taking a wait-and-see stance.

Representative Timo Traff from the district of Northern Helsinki confessed that he is a supporter of SMP [Finnish Rural Party] cooperation. He feared that the party would lose its own peculiar nature in cooperation with the center. The applause indicated that other doubters could be found at the congress.

The Center Party and the Christian League have concluded an election alliance agreement in the election district of Kuopio. Negotiations have been conducted in all the other districts. For tactical reasons it is doubtful that agreements will be reached everywhere.

This trend toward the center is also probably a means by which the Christian League will attempt to shake off the image of being a protest party. In the opinion of the party leadership it is also the best means for bringing a halt to the decline in support.

Lebanon Causing Distress

The attitude toward Israel and the events in Lebanon came up in several speeches and discussions. The Israeli attack on Lebanon has evoked cautious criticism within the party. Editor-in-Chief Eero Hirvonen of KRISTITYN VASTUU received sharp criticism from a Helsinki representative for drawing a parallel between the Falkland and Lebanon wars.

Party Secretary Almgren considered the Lebanese crisis as the main reason for the need to introduce peacekeeping troops into the area. However, claiming a lack of sufficient information he refused to comment on Israeli actions.

MP Sauli Hautala, for his part, considered the crisis to be the main reason

for the fact that Lebanon lacks proper defense forces. At the same time he referred to Finland's small defense budget.

In between singing hymns those attending the congress discussed unemployment, alcohol, and education. Party Secretary Almgren, who delivered the political report instead of Westerholm, criticized the education bill package presented to the parliament. In his opinion schools have been developed in a Marxist-naturalist direction since the 1960's.

Chairman Sauli Hautala of the parliamentary faction demanded stronger criticism of policy.

In addition to electing individuals, the congress approved a new overall platform as well as resolutions. The congress will conclude on Sunday.

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CSO: 3107/146

CHRISTIAN PARTY ELECTS NEW LEADERSHIP AT CONGRESS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 20 Jun 82 p 9

[Article by Esa Valiverronen: "Christian League Changes Party Leadership"]

[Text] Oulu--As expected the Christian League elected Party Secretary Esko Almgren, 49, as the party's new chairman. In the vote Almgren beat out parliamentary faction Chairman Sauli Hautala by a vote of 307--118.

Hautala's election was primarily supported by representatives from the districts of Oulu and Kainuu. They doubted Congregationalist Almgren's ability to maintain the party's support. In the election for the chairmanship Ulla Jarvilehto and Olavi Ronkainen also received votes. Of the nearly 800 representatives 458 came to Oulu.

MP and Pastor Olavi Ronkainen, 49, was elected second chairman with the same clear majority. Ronkainen, who was elected to represent the voice of the Lutheran clergy, has become known as an opponent of pornography, among other things. MP Ulla Jarvilehto was unanimously elected as third chairman.

These elections meant a complete change of party leadership. Since Raino Westerholm and Impi Muroma declined to run for reelection, only Ilmari Helimaki was a candidate for the chairmanship. In the elections for second chairman Ronkainen received 267 votes, Asser Stanback 64, Helimaki 59, Erkki Korhonen 45, and Ulla Jarvilehto 2.

Closer Cooperation Wanted With Center Party

The Christian League will elect a new party secretary in October. An interim holder of this office will be elected next Wednesday.

The first task of the new chairmanship will be to find methods for maintaining the party's rapidly declining support at the present level. The party is considering closer cooperation with the Center Party and in this way possible participation in the government also.

However, the new Chairman Almgren disputes arguments that the party is striving to redeem its share of government by means of election alliances. In his opinion election alliances are the first but not, however, the only form of cooperation with the centrist parties.

Ronkainen and Jarvilehto, for their part, promised that the party would continue its strict policy line in matters of alcohol and abortion. "Our policy is not becoming softer at all in this respect," stated Jarvilehto.

Alcohol was still the subject of discussion on Saturday. The congress approved a resolution in which compulsory examination of identification is demanded in liquor stores. It was also demanded that beer be put back under the jurisdiction of Alko [State Liquor Monopoly]. Also the party platform included the hope that ATK would participate in the supervision of Alko sales.

In the discussion of the platform the congress approved a change which means a cautious positive attitude toward increasing the use of nuclear power. No greater changes were made in the platform since Impi Muroma pushed the proposal through at such a fast rate in the morning that the still sleepy audience did not have a chance to make any changes.

Vice Chairman Juha Hamalainen of the Youth Organization even complained about this to Muroma. However, the majority of those attending the congress were satisfied with the tempo.

Esko Almgren began his political career as a Conservative Party member of the Kotka City Council in 1966. In 1970 he was a delegate of the Conservative Party's Kymenlaakso District as well as a candidate member of the party delegation. He joined the Christian League in 1975.

In the 1979 elections Almgren won Chairman Raimo Westerholm's seat in the parliament. Just before that he had been elected party secretary of the Christian League.

In his previous job Almgren was a biology teacher. In his home town of Kotka he was a rector for 10 years.

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CSO: 3107/146

PAPER EVALUATES PERFORMANCE OF COMPLETED PARLIAMENT SESSION

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 25 Jun 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Parliament Session Was Peaceful, But Room for Criticism Also"]

[Text] The parliament has now adjourned for its summer vacation in a completely different mood than a year ago. At that time especially the latter part of the session was dominated by sharp political conflicts as a result of which parliament was compelled to enact laws until the eve of Midsummer Day. Now the agenda was long for other reasons. There were no political conflicts shaking the government or even extending to the foundations of the constitution or differences were not interpreted as such.

In fact, the whole spring session was politically stable and peaceful, which is, of course, a good thing. Political passions, in general, were restrained by the economic recession and international tensions. Even in parliamentary circles it was understood that raising large conflicts in this situation is not worth while.

The worst social evils have been rectified over the years so that there are no great urgent reforms demanding immediate attention. Rather the deliberation concerned the funding of already enacted reforms and above all how unemployment can be reduced.

Under these conditions the results of the parliament's legislative work were not revolutionary. However, from among them it is possible to find several legislative acts of general interest such as the administrative procedural law, which will help citizens in transactions with officials, the revision to the street payment bill, the reform to the inheritance law preventing the breaking up of land parcels, the reorganization of state assistance to local governments, the new farm income law, and so on.

On the other hand, there has been little public understanding of the reform of the MP pension bill initiated by parliament itself, according to which pension benefits for MP's were improved perceptibly and which makes them a privileged class among pensioners. This law, in particular, will remain as a black spot on the spring session. It would have been much more appropriate if this issue had been brought before parliament by a government proposal. However, in spite of a request from parliament, a proposal was not forthcoming

since the government did not feel a need for it any more than did the Justice Ministry.

Otherwise, the interaction between the government and parliament moved quickly. The government's numerous proposals went through parliament rather easily. The government also gave parliament a budget policy report, which, as the discussion on it, remained pallid and unfruitful. The government was also tested in April by the Conservative Party's housing policy interpellation, the result of which was once again a vote of confidence for the government.

On the other hand, the statement on an environmental ministry and the war of words waged around it turned out to be colorful. As a result, the parliament approved with nonsocialist votes a stand which the interior minister assures us will result in the establishment of an environmental ministry. However, the date of establishment and the extent of the new ministry's jurisdiction are open. They are subject to appropriations in the budget and a change in the law providing for the number of ministries, which will be voted on after the elections as the leftwing has intimated. In the fall it will be seen whether reason and the urgency of environmental protection will prevail or whether the desire to use this issue as a political weapon in the election campaign will prevail.

The parliament's problem in the spring session was not a lack of work and issues or the usual lack of attendance resulting from this. There were more than enough government proposals and initiatives coming from the representatives themselves. A discussion of some of the important proposals was postponed until fall close to the elections. Such issues are, among other things, a reform of the job protection bill, the bill concerning fines for minor offences, the surname law, the law concerning foreigners as well as legislation on basic education, the reform of military justice as well as the budget proposal to be presented in the fall and the laws connected with it.

The parliament's problem is more that of the indifferent attitude of its members toward their work. The absenteeism of MP's from full sessions was -- except during the discussion of their own pension bill -- in general, conspicuous. This does not promote the prestige of the parliament in spite of the fact that another important reason sometimes prevents attendance at a session.

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CSO: 3107/146

BRIEFS

EX-LIBERALS FORM GREEN PARTY--Slightly more than 30 people believing in the success of their own ideas established a new party on Saturday in Helsinki under the leadership of graduate engineer Seppo Westerlund. In its founding declaration the Progressive League emphasizes that the party does not belong either to the right or to the left, but is a radical alternative for people who have become disenchanted with the other parties. Those establishing the new party were primarily made up of former members of the Liberal People's Party, who opposed the merger of the LKP [Liberal People's Party] with the Center Party. At the founding meeting Westerlund called the party a green party. "The league also does not approve a policy under the name of a centrist policy," he stated in refuting the argument that the Progressive League is a liberal party. The members of the Progressive League are adhering to a new "open democracy" in that no chairman will be elected for the party. However, a leadership troika is being formed by those who signed the document to found the party, Westerlund, Kainu Mikkola, and Aila Virtanen as well as Eila Aro. The general discussion at this meeting was primarily about taxes and the Falkland war, which evoked violently conflicting opinions. Even though the party did not elect a chairman, the Progressive League did, however, receive a 17-member governing body. The Progressive League does not yet intend to collect 5,000 signatures, by which the party would be able to register itself in the party registry. According to Westerlund, the Progressive League will be able to form constituencies in at least four election districts, which will nominate candidates for the parliamentary elections.
[Text] [Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 6 Jun 82 p 7] 10576

CSO: 3107/146

POLITICAL

FRANCE

ARON ON OPPOSITION, INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY

Paris LE FIGARO in French 11 Jun 82 p 2

[Interview with Raymond Aron, journalist and author, by Bernard Bonilauri; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Question] Speaking against the intellectuals and artists who criticized the attitude of France when confronted with events in Poland, Jack Lang had these rather harsh words: "Those people want first of all to dislodge the French political majority before bringing aid to the Polish people." Does this episode seem to you characteristic of the relationship which was established between the intellectual community and the new regime?

[Answer] I find the accusation made by the minister of culture almost ridiculous. The intellectuals protested against the signing of the Franco-Soviet agreement on the construction of the gas pipeline. Their critical reactions expressed the inevitable and classic divergence between the intellectual world and government officials. When socialists led the opposition they let themselves go to excesses just like those committed by the intellectuals at the time of the Polish crisis.

While intellectuals do not manifest any intention of upsetting the stability of the socialist-communist regime, it seems to me that at the same time the high intelligentsia does not feel, any stirring of enthusiasm or hopes with regard to the governmental climate. On this point the contrast between 1936 and 1981 is striking. At the time of the Popular Front, so-called left-wing intellectuals welcomed, joined with, and supported the government of Leon Blum with great enthusiasm. Last year the transfer of majority took effect in an absolute calm. The element of surprise came from the lethargy of intellectuals and, to a certain degree, from the people themselves.

[Question] What is the origin of the kind of disenchantment that is expressed by the attitude of a good portion of intellectuals toward power?

[Answer] The Socialist Party is first of all a part of civil servants, second-class teachers. When government spokesmen deal with cultural questions they arouse more irony than anticipation. The fact is that among the current leaders we find scarcely any personalities comparable to Leon Blum, capable of attracting our intellectuals.

Hostility Toward the USSR

The "intellorats," to use the fasionable expression, cannot fully sympathize with the left-wing coalition, because the ex-communist or ex-progressive intellectuals today are ardent defenders of human rights, and they reject communism.

There is also the prosaic side of the action taken by the government. The decision to nationalize the banks and large corporations has nothing about it to astound left-wing intellectuals. In 1936 the nationalization of factories corresponded to certain nostalgias, desires, and mythologies. In our time, the average intellectual, on a barely average level, knows that the change in status of the corporations brings with it no essential change in the human condition.

The current policy is scarcely the culmination of the revolutionary or leftist wishes of, let us say, half of the editors of LE TEMPS MODERNES, any more than it succeeds in involving the other half of the editors who are, nonetheless, convinced of the superiority of the new government over the former one. People on the left continue to believe that the change in power is beneficial to the French, an opinion which is justified, from their perspective, on condition that one forget the dangers of economic regression.

Intellectuals are probably favorable to the ideas of Robert Badinter, which are, in their view, more liberal and less "repressive" than those of Alain Peyrefitte. But, in the final analysis, true debates about ideas scarcely exist any more. The period of the great living ideologies is temporarily over. There remains only a strong hostility toward the USSR and the despotic nations which dot the planet.

It is, fundamentally, the inertia of the opposition more than the dullness of the intellectual community which astonishes me. For a year, the socialists have occupied the entire public scene. Confronted with this monopoly of influence, the adversaries of the PSF and PCF could have reacted with greater liveliness or more mockery.

[Question] What is the reason for this relative unobtrusiveness of the political or ideological counterforce?

[Answer] Up to now the discussions and controversies among political leaders have practically disappeared from the radio as well as from television. Opinion is made known in a modern society thanks to televised debates. Now, radio and television, liberated by the socialists, are much more of one accord than under Giscard. I do not think I have seen during these recent months either Jacques Chirac, Raymond Barre, Jean Lecanuet, or Valery Giscard d'Estaing analyzing the country's policies before the cameras. It is in Parliament that the opponents are expressing themselves, but the French people do not pay attention to parliamentary discussions. In a small number of daily papers, journalists maintain a critical dialogue with those in power. In fact, there is no large national opposition newspaper.

[Question] Aren't the opposition forces confronted as well by a type of intellectual challenge, since they have to elaborate a program, an alternative?

[Answer] In his last book, "C'est ici le Chemin" [Here is the Path], Pierre Mauroy quotes half of one of my sentences. In fact, I have written: "The former majority was able to govern without a program, but to return to power they need a program and an idea." The prime minister has concluded from this that a government cannot get along without a program. Everything depends on the meaning that one gives to this word.

The governments of the Fifth Republic were above all administrators. In the political vocabulary, "program" usually designates the totality of changes that those who hold power hope to introduce into the social organization. The so-called right-wing parties are by nature less reformist than their left-wing rivals; however, their administrative program has often shown itself to be effective.

From Devaluation to Devaluation

The socialists defend a doctrine which includes a program of administration as well. They are inspired by a plan of economic recovery through the increase in purchasing power due to the increase in social transfers. The application of this program has had as a consequence a general deficit on the balance sheets--foreign trade, the state budget, social security--without gaining in return the projected increase in production.

If it does not revise its policy, the socialist-communist government will be incapable of reducing the inflation rate. The divergence between the rise of French and German prices will continue to increase. And the state will see itself forced to devalue the franc in relationship to the mark (and other monies which are linked to it) once or twice a year.

Do you believe that these technical discussions on finances and the economy are of a nature to provoke excitement or impetus among intellectuals?

[Question] No, but don't the liberal intellectuals have as their mission to aid politicians who combat socialist plans?

[Answer] The opposition is confronted with a double problem: how can one conceive of the solution outside the socialist regime? What aspects of the reforms established by the left should one suppress?

I do not believe that the non-socialists ought to imitate the socialist party of Mitterrand with his 130 propositions for France. Nor should they define, in the manner of CERES [Center for Socialist Studies, Research and Education], the symmetry of the plan for a break with capitalism.

The idea of opposition is subject to constraints that are at the same time precise and difficult to evaluate. Is it necessary, for example, to hold on to the hypothesis of an alternation like that of 10 May, which would bring the current opposition to power in a block? It is not certain. The socialists

are going to institute a proportional election system. Therefore, a complex situation is conceivable in which the socialist party would govern without the communists, but with a part of the centrist forces, a situation in which the opposition parties will no longer be necessarily bound together by the rule of majority election.

It is unrealistic to have in mind only a simple representation of complete alternating. If the left-wing of the ex-majority with a social-democratic tendency would consider directing the country along with the socialists, we would have the same orientations in the economic sector, only somewhat modified. One can reflect on the means of breaking with socialism only by imagining a majority resolved to choose a different path.

Defining a "Re-Action"

The problem, then, is intellectual in the purely political sense: the entire skill consists in learning to reflect attentively on what is happening. To the extent that the socialist experiment develops, the opposition is obliged to wonder what features of socialist administration could be suppressed in case of a change in the majority. The ideal would be for it to come to an agreement on a strategy of "re-action," of ready response to what is being built.

It is not sufficient to preach the return to true liberalism which France has never experienced, or even a systematic reversal of socialist policy. We will not go back to the situation that existed before 10 May. Thus, in the corporations it is important to comply with the reality resulting from the application of the Auroux law. How will the labor unions, the workers and the heads of corporations reconcile compliance with the new legislation with production demands? Starting from that point, the question of knowing to what extent socialist reform is or is not compatible with a policy which would once again give France dynamic and competitive capacity in coping with other industrial nations will be asked.

[Question] Don't you think that the difficulty of conceiving the future in a concrete way opens up to intellectuals the role of advisors to the Prince, or of future Princes in the case of the opposition.

[Answer] Jean d'Ormesson has written somewhere that I would have liked to be an advisor to the Prince in the image of Henry Kissinger. Journalists love to play with set phrases. In France political men choose their advisors from among the civil servants. Neither General de Gaulle nor Georges Pompidou nor Valery Giscard d'Estaing sought to surround themselves with intellectuals. At the very most, Giscard d'Estaing thought it right to form a council of experts for nuclear questions.

Within the opposition today are scores of "clubs which reflect on things in a disorderly way, each one with its own prejudices and preferences. In my opinion, the most useful thing would be for the French Democratic Union [UDF] and the Rally for the Republic [RPR] to form groups of economic and political advisors, assigned to study the evaluation of the situation and to propose solutions for change. The half-political, half-intellectual measures of the

opposition have interest and value only on the condition that they remain very close to France as we know it, and for the purpose of gauging the effects of the socialist administration as we are discovering it.

[Question] Valery Giscard d'Estaing has just declared that in matters "of reflection, proposition and conceptualization of a grand design" the opposition has had a breakdown "of imagination"....

[Answer] If the former president had had a grand design we would have known it when he was head of state. The ambition of Giscard was to protect France against the type of religious war into which the left and the right ceremoniously throw themselves. Now the French, weary of seeing the same faces in government, have opted for the solution that the supporters of Giscard thought was out of the question--to confide power to opponents, faithful to their ideology.

The Limits of the Possible

Giscard reproaches the current opposition for lacking ideas and conceptions. The socialists claim to govern on the basis of a grand social design. We see the result. I would not say, like Valery Giscard d'Estaing, that the economic machinery is already broken down. Nevertheless, the condition of the economy appears to me in every way worse than it was when the socialists inherited it.

To want to lighten the burdens of administration, to return a little vigor to liberalism, to encourage Frenchmen both to the right and to the left to count first of all on themselves and a little less on the state: these objectives do not, perhaps, reveal a grand design, but they are not any the less essential.

Michel Rocard has declared that the French enjoy a social protection which goes beyond the limits of the possible. Nobody has the courage to envisage a profound reform which would consist of limiting social security benefits to people having a certain level of income, above which individuals would organize mutual societies for themselves, or would subscribe to private insurance companies. This transformation of the social spirit would clearly go further than the socialist change. But it is out of the question.

[Question] "We should not have been counted on to seek a new alliance with the communist party," writes Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie in his last book. Beyond the presence of the communists in power is there not any more cultural reason for the malaise of the intellectuals?

[Answer] To the extent to which intellectuals of the extreme left or communist sympathizers have become authentic liberals and true democrats, they do not necessarily prefer Francois Mitterrand to a so-called right-wing president. Let's leave aside the case of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, who polarized personal grievances against himself. And then I am tempted to say that the socialists, who have had the monopoly on speech for a year, do not give the impression of a superior intelligence. Certainly their predecessors did not impress us either, but they were less self-important, less self-satisfied, than the present leaders. The latter present themselves at the same time as the only generous, humane, cultivated beings, capable of having ideas. Holding themselves above the market place, they make the dizzying claim of creating a socialist culture. That's all we need!

PAPER VIEWS SWEDISH FEARS OF USSR SUBMARINE THREAT

PM031225 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 2 Aug 82 p 2

[Editorial: "Foreign Submarines"]

[Text] It sometimes happens that military men forget their usual unwillingness to speak and begin thinking out loud. Last year a general attached to the U.S. National Security Council was dismissed because he said in public that "the Soviet superpower, which has begun to stir itself, will strike."

Swedish Defense Staff Chief Vice Admiral Bengt Schuback, does not run the risk of losing his post because of a thought-provoking interview he gave to SVENSKA DAGBLADET. He has confronted his countrymen with the following dramatic comment--a foreign power is preparing war against Sweden.

The reason for this interview with one of the top chiefs in the Swedish defense forces was the recent submarine hunt in Swedish waters. At regular intervals there are reports of foreign submarines sighted in Swedish waters. The Swedish Navy put out and tries to locate the mysterious vessel, but so far luck has not been on its side. The last couple of weeks' submarine alerts in Sweden's archipelagos have been in vain. The intruders have succeeded thus far in getting away.

After the lean results of the Swedish warships' emergency actions it is tempting to ask whether the Swedish Coast Guard is seeing sights. Vice Admiral Schuback pushes these doubts to one side. He says that the navy has "as good as" certain evidence that one or more foreign submarines have been in Swedish waters in the course of a few days in July. It is the cautious officer who uses the expression "as good as." In reality the tiny reservation contained in this expression means that the Swedish defense forces' leaders are sure of their facts. Illegal and unfriendly activities are taking place along the Swedish coast. These should also be noted by Sweden's neighbors, not least Norway, where uninvited guests have also been observed along the coastline.

Vice Admiral Schuback does not name the "foreign power" he is referring to. But he makes it perfectly clear that it is the Soviet Union. This makes his assessment of the situation in the Baltic especially interesting--and worrying. It would have been natural to assume that the submarine affair off

Karlskrona last fall was so embarrassing for those in power in Moscow that they would show greater respect for Sweden's sea boundaries. Not only Sweden, but the whole of the Nordic region was shocked and alarmed by the report that Soviet Submarine U137 had entered Swedish waters with nuclear arms on board. It is unfortunate that we have to note that this reaction, which the leaders in the Kremlin should have felt as a political burden, has had no effect. They are pursuing the same course, as if their little accident off Karlskrona never took place.

"The Soviet Union is preparing itself to wage war in Swedish waters." These are Vice Admiral Schuback's own words. In the overall global strategic context the statement is hardly surprising. But it must be natural for the Swedes to think of the Soviet superpower as their neighbor. And from Moscow come slogans calling on the peoples living by the Baltic to make this inland sea a "sea of peace." Such slogans lose their credibility when they come from rulers which cynically allow their naval combat forces to violate Swedish sovereignty in order to train them for war.

The Soviet submarines come to Sweden's archipelagos like thieves in the night. One day they could have completely different intentions. Sweden's military planners are aware of this for obvious reasons. Vice Admiral Bengt Schuback has outlined the reality which exists alongside Sweden's neutrality. And it really does not give the Swedes the feeling of safety and security they had been hoping for in the place they have found for themselves outside the two major military blocs.

CSO: 3108/143

POLITICAL

TURKEY

TURKES OFFERS DEFENSE AGAINST LEFTIST CHARGES

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 11 Jul 82 pp 9, 12

Text In the course of the trial which is proceeding at the Military Tribunal of the Ankara Martial Law Command, the defendants were asked to testify in connection with a document which is related to some of the admissions that were made by Ali Yurtaslan to the newspaper AYDINLIK. The following are excerpts from the trial record.

"Yasar Okuyan who was brought to the stand in connection with this matter said that he first wanted to examine the newspapers in order to refrain from misleading the court. Three newspapers were shown to the defendant who was allowed to examine them in the presence of the court. Following this, the defendant said that the person named Ali Yurtaslan had been writing articles of this kind for a period of approximately one month. He said that two copies of the newspapers were kept at the Press Bureau for the purpose of evaluating the news and issuing disavowals. The defendant said that there had been occasions upon which his party had disavowed information that pertained to the party and that was incorrect. He said that the preparatory materials used in the issuing of the disavowals could be found at the party's Press Bureau. The defendant said that he would provide an evaluation of the information contained within the newspapers once access to the disavowals and the materials used by the Press Bureau in their preparation could be obtained."

Alpaslan Turkes requested to take the stand in order to testify about the matter of the newspapers. He said:

"As I have stated in detail during my questioning, we are the defenders of the government of the Turkish Republic

which has been the legacy of Ataturk. Those who have espoused Marxism and Communism object to this. With the foreign enemies of Turkey, they engage in work and activities that seek the dismemberment of the government of the Turkish Republic and the Turkish people. We also opposed separatism. Persons who have espoused Marxism and Communism also engage in separatism. They display their separatist aims by referring to the peoples of Turkey. We have said in the past that we believed that only one people existed in Turkey and voiced our opposition to separatism. We will always defend this viewpoint. We will counter their efforts to mislead the people and the young by providing enlightenment to our people and our young. Today, a Communist movement that is pro-Russian as well as a Communist movement that is pro-Chinese exist in the world. Both of these are opposed to the unity of the Turkish Republic and both engage in racist activities. The pro-Chinese communists are also known as Maoists and have engaged in separatism by claiming that another group exists in Eastern Turkey. The pro-Russian communists are pursuing a similar line with their publications in DIRILIS magazine. These persons oppose the viewpoint that the government of the Turkish Republic is an indivisible entity of its country and its people. Persons of their mentality object to our defending and advocating the notion that the country is an indivisible entity and consequently choose to lie about us and to slander us. Because of all of these reasons, the information that is found within the newspapers which you have obtained is contrary to reality. Those persons are opposed to the government of the Turkish Republic which is the legacy of Ataturk and to the existence of unity. They oppose the supremacy of the ideology found within the Constitution. We on the other hand, support the supremacy of the ideology of the Constitution. For this reason, I would like to state that this information which concerns us and which consists of nothing but lies and slander in addition to being contrary to reality should not be taken seriously."

Defendant Muhsin Yazicioglu said: "We do not accept the articles which appeared in the newspaper AYDINLIK and which pertained to myself as well as our organization. First of all, the Idealist Youth Organization (UGD) does not have a legal desk. Such a desk does not exist. This has been fabricated by the articles. The first of these

is an attempt to use negative propaganda for the purpose of placing the educated masses as well as government forces in opposition to Turkish nationalists. The other (second) article seeks to mount an attempt to make up for the inability of the left to challenge the judges and the judicial system of Turkey. It is intended to defame and slander for the purpose of undermining the confidence of the Turkish People in Turkish law and justice and to subsequently benefit from this collapse of confidence. The third article seeks to rally the fractionalized left to a Maoist viewpoint and in their own words, to oppose Fascism by bringing about Maoist unity at a grassroot level. However, the inaccuracy of these articles was subsequently stated in the newspapers. The articles were refuted and protested in the newspaper YURUYUS."

Defendant Yasar Okuyan requested to take the stand and his request was granted. He said: "Clippings originating from several newspapers and pertaining to the matter of the commando camps and the formal accusation used in this trial can be found in the trial dossier. I have been a professional journalist for 14 years. I spent four of these years working in the press information section of the party. I wish to raise a point in connection with these matters. Every newspaper and journalist espouses certain political beliefs. Events are reflected in newspapers in the form of news items and editorials from an angle defined by these viewpoints and beliefs. On this or that occasion we have been witnesses to similar reports about our party, and news such as these have been printed in many newspapers. As a political party, we sent replies or refutations to as many of these as we could. Yet, it is not possible to respond to all of them. While the news are being printed as news items or editorials in conformity with the politics of the particular newspaper, they do not always reflect the full truth. I have on occasion indicated to my fellow journalists that room was not being given in the press to news concerning press conferences pertaining to my party. I have asked them to give room to the news and the press conferences of our party. On the other hand, it has been said that the press conferences of our party are not receiving press coverage because they are conducted in a rather monotonous fashion. This situation applies not only to our press but to foreign newspapers as well. When a person who was being tried for making a statement to a foreign newspaper claimed that he had not made such a statement, it was discovered upon listening to the journalist in question that the journalist himself had written the statement."

WORKER RIGHTS EYED WITHIN NEW CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 15 Jul 82 p 6

[Article by Sukran Ketenci: "Constitution, Law or Contract?"]

[Text] One look at the labor-related provisions of the draft constitution and all you can do is wish the heart, or rather, logic of the whole thing was different, wondering if you got hold of the wrong text. Even disregarding the implications of the principles therein, it is hard to tell whether the articles are in fact constitutional provisions or the provisions of a draft law or a draft collective agreement.

"Workers and employers may not be members of more than one union. Unions may not pursue political goals, engage in political activities, receive contributions from or make contributions to political parties or act jointly with associations, professional organizations of a public nature and foundations to these ends.

"Members shall pay their dues directly to the union, may not claim the right to engage in union activities on company time and must keep strike and lockout funds provided for in their bylaws in national banks.

"Provisions may not be placed in collective labor contracts that would violate provisions of the law or alter or abrogate them. No more than one collective labor contract may be concluded for the same period of time in the same workplace."

Does not any political ban going beyond the prohibition of organic ties between unions and political parties conflict with the very existence of unions? For instance, can there be a question of an employers' union lacking the right to speak out on credit policy, or a workers' union unable to express an opinion on the price of bread? Both are in a general sense the stuff of politics.

The ban on joining more than one union is a reaction against union inflation in Turkey, but it restricts universal constitutional rights. Even if such a restriction were deemed necessary under present circumstances, wouldn't such a restriction of rights be better placed in the laws, not in the constitution, for ease of restoring them after unionism returns to normal in Turkey?

How a member pays his union dues is a matter for union bylaws and collective labor contracts. When union rights were made constitutional in 1961, the "check-off" system was written into law in order to protect the unions, bearing in mind the

centuries of industrial accretion and lack of class consciousness. Aside from the fact that the unions will lose much of their power and the outcome will be the opposite of that intended by the lawmakers whose focus was on big unionism, what business does this have in the constitution? Likewise, as placing provisions in collective labor contracts for payroll deduction of dues is a most natural right of the unions, by implication, so is banning this right.

A constitutional ban on allowing time off from work for union activities is tantamount to a ban on amateur unionism. Moreover, the inability of workplace representatives to do their jobs will mean that the unions will be unable to carry on various activities, training being foremost. In short, unionism will be turned over to a handful of professionals and the worker's ties with his union will be severed. The union, rather, will cease to function as a union.

But a more important provision to alienate the unions from their function is the ban on allowing collective contracts to exceed statutory limits. The *raison d'être* of unions is to take economic and social rights favoring workers beyond the statutes through contracts. Rights develop little by little through contracts, gradually gaining general currency. The lawmaker writes the generalized rights which take hold into new laws, giving workers without contracts the benefit of them. Otherwise, contracts are meaningless and there is no need for them.

What happens if restrictions which do this kind of damage to the substance of rights, however justified the reaction to practical problems or rationalization of them may seem, and arrangements which ought to be made only by laws or contracts are placed in the constitution? The constitution will be undermined from the very beginning just through the existence of the unions and their activities despite all the restrictions. As soon as it goes into effect, it will be outmoded and social and community pressure for changing it will begin.

8349
CSO: 4654/393

DANISH PAPER: USSR SUBMARINE THREAT DICTATES VIGILANCE

PM031513 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 31 Jul 82 p 6

[Editorial: "Submarines in the Baltic?"]

[Text] Since the submarine affair in the Swedish archipelago, when a Soviet submarine ran aground on a Swedish rock, the numerous reports of submarines in Swedish territorial waters have been taken more seriously. As far as is known none of the submarines reported over the years was definitely identified, and certainly none was forced to the surface or sunk. For this reason the reports began gradually to be taken less seriously, until a Soviet submarine captain was unlucky enough to stray too far and run aground in an area where he had absolutely no business to be--unless he had a mission to carry out which was against current international law and Sweden's well-known regulations.

It goes without saying that he had such a mission. The affair was an embarrassing exposure not only of the Soviet submarine captain, but also of the Soviet Union's Baltic policy with its stated goal of turning the Baltic into a sea of peace and allowing the whole of the Nordic area to be a nuclear-free zone.

The submarine turned out to be carrying nuclear arms, and this has naturally given rise to conjecture that many other Soviet submarines in the Baltic carry nuclear arms, over and above the six aging diesel-powered missile-carrying submarines which have been deployed in the Baltic since 1976.

This is the background to the worries which naturally arise when Soviet submarines are observed in Swedish territorial waters. It is also the background to the assessments the Swedish defense staff--and they are not alone--are making of the motives behind the striking Soviet interest in Swedish waters.

It might sound somewhat drastic when the Swedish defense staff chief speaks of planned military operations against Sweden. But he is supported by his Danish counterpart, who has declared that the many Soviet violations of Swedish territorial waters cannot be coincidences.

The fact that the Soviet Union has made preparations for military operations against Sweden and certainly against other Baltic countries does not of course mean that a decision has been or will be made in Moscow to put such war plans into effect. But it is puzzling that the Soviet Union is not showing greater caution when we remember what an expensive business the grounded submarine turned out to be for Moscow.

Of course, the possibility cannot be ruled out that several of the reported sightings could be mistaken, although the Swedish defense staff has taken them seriously and not taken any chances.

Over a number of years there has been a gradual shift in the Warsaw Pact's naval maneuvers in the Baltic toward the west, closer to Swedish, Danish and West German territory. This makes all tactical warnings shorter than they were and requires increased vigilance and combat readiness. This is why a false alarm and a fruitless search are preferable to an unpleasant surprise, if the sea of peace is to be kept peaceful.

CSO: 3106/152

MILITARY

FRANCE

REPORT DESCRIBES MODIFICATIONS ON 'INFLEXIBLE' FOR M4 MISSILE

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 19 Jun 82 pp 4-7

[Article by Chief Weapons Engineer Le Seac'h: "The 'Inflexible'"]

[Excerpts] What Is the "Inflexible"?

It can be defined as the first of the missile-launching nuclear submarines [SNLE's] capable of handling the M4: SNLE refitted for M4. It will be distinguished from its elders currently in service first of all by its entirely new weapon system and secondly by various minor alterations or modifications.

To make the differences between these two generations of vessels quite clear, it is necessary first to say a brief word about the missile itself, for it is the changes in the latter that influence the make-up of the launching craft. The new M4 missile has a multiple-warhead reentry body whose range is on the order of 4,000 km. To obtain these performance characteristics, it was necessary to increase the diameter of the missile considerably, which entails a complete change of the internal tube--a sort of case in which the missile is placed. But the external tube, housing this case and forming part of the rigid hull, does not have its diameter modified. Since the missile is different, though, certain orifices for access to it are modified. The present SNLE's that will also carry M4 missiles will therefore undergo a real remodelling of their missile compartments. Whence the term "M4 refitting" to designate the major haulouts for this purpose.

To return to the "Inflexible," its rigid hull will be very similar to that of its predecessors; but its outside plates will be changed more or less extensively. The propulsion machinery will be changed very little: the main engine, as well as certain auxiliaries, is undergoing some modifications aimed at improving the vessel's acoustical discretion to take account of the progress in passive submarine detection.

The vessel will benefit from modernization of its submarine detection installations as well as from an entirely new tactical-data processing system.

The situation can therefore be summed up by saying that to build the "Inflexible," it is necessary to take, vis-a-vis its predecessors, an identical rigid hull, somewhat modified external plates, and notably different internal installations.

From the First Welding to the Sea Trials

In September 1978, when the decision was made to resume construction, half of the plates and forged pieces necessary for building the hull were available. In order to achieve the final objective, it was necessary to get three types of action going fast, from Cherbourg's point of view:

- to get the work of prefabricating the rigid-hull sections going again;
- to purchase the other half of the steel necessary for making the hull;
- to launch the studies for adapting the hull to the new version.

It was also found--an interesting fact for us--that the raw materiel we had available was just sufficient to enable us to work until delivery of the first plates of the second lot. But this was possible only on condition that the order for the second lot be given to the supplier before the beginning of 1979. The decision was therefore made by the minister to release the credits to commit this sum as of November 1978. It should also be noted that certain of the most urgent forged pieces were reused and that a veritable "race against the industrial clock" was run in order to keep to the imperative assembly date.

During this time, crews were getting the prefabrication work going again, but in this area, the solution adopted was a little different from that used for the previous vessels. Since that construction, a new method for prefabricating the hull sections had been perfected: instead of setting up the assembly per a horizontal axis, it was made vertical, which had the advantage of improving the welders' working conditions but the disadvantage of requiring special equipment for turning the section over between its fabrication and placing it on the ways. Such tools could not be readied for the bigger sections in the short time available; thus it was decided to fabricate the small sections by the SNA [Nuclear Attack Submarine] (vertical axis) method and the big sections by the SNLE (horizontal axis) method.

Analogous action was taken by the main collaborating entities: the ECAN [Naval Arms and Construction Establishment]-Indret for the propulsion equipment, the CEA [Atomic Energy Commission]/DPN [Nuclear Propulsion Branch] for the nuclear boiler-plant. In particular, the CEA/DPN, as prime contractor, had the ECAN of Indret, its subcontractor, resume the fabrication of the principal capacities [as published] of the nuclear boiler-plant.

But the definition studies for this new vessel also had to be started. In the STCAN [Naval Weapons Construction Technical Service], the definition had been started--modification of the external hull, of form, etc--and the DCAN [Naval Construction and Weapons Directorate] of Cherbourg made hulls (out of wood!) for mockups that were subsequently to make it possible to do the detail studies of the compartments.

The laying of the first section on the ways, a symbolic event, took place on 27 March 1980, in the presence of the local maritime authorities.

To give an idea of things, the section constituting the first piece of the structure had the characteristic of weighing 115 tons. To make it, 4.5 m² of plates were needed, costing on the order of Fr 2 million. The labor for its

construction totaled 14,500 hours--40 percent for fabrication of the frames, 20 percent for forming of plates, 20 percent for mounting on framework, and 20 percent for welding.

The laying on the ways was to be followed by a period of joining the sections to one another. This work went at a sustained rate of about two joinings per month.

During this time, the technical definition went on: on the one hand, in the STCAN, with definition of the general plan of accommodations and publication of the overall specification for the vessel; and on the other hand, at Cherbourg, with the first outlines of the outfitting of the compartments and definition of new materials.

In a general way, it can be said of this construction that the fabrication of the hull essentially went in conformity with the old programs. One should note, however, an improvement in the fabrication of the external missile-launching tubes and a considerable shortening of the assembly of the rigid hull.

On the other hand, completion of the vessel's internal installations has already posed and will pose in future a number of difficulties due to the very strained program. In effect, it should be kept in mind that these internal "guts" comprise some 65,000 to 70,000 distinct items (not counting the bolts!), of which about 40,000 are apparatuses (electronic, electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic), and the rest (25,000 to 30,000) are connections by cable (about 240 km of it) or by piping (about 36 km). If one also keeps it in mind that the electrical installations comprise 300,000 terminal points, one sees the extent of the work that remains to be completed.

To manage this activity, PERT [Project Evaluation and Review Technique] planning of 20,000 tasks has been developed: a great many special meetings and the famous "work-site conferences" make it possible to sensitize each responsible official to the target dates that he has to stick to, to adjust the "assembly logics," and sometimes to discover the "bugs" in the program. Apart from these major actions, there is the patient and ongoing action of the coordination team, which has to carry out on site its work of circulating information and spreading knowledge of a common language--the so-called "Tower of Babel" project has erred in this regard--and realistic definition of the objectives.

To complete the vessel through to its entry into active service (beginning of 1985), three main phases are to follow one another:

- construction on the ways until launching (June 1982);
- completion in Homet form;
- the sea trials.

The construction phase comprises essentially the building of the rigid hull, the ballasting, the fore and aft framing and the beginning of the laying of the cable and pipe connections.

Completion consists in finishing all the internal outfitting: the operational compartments, crew quarters, auxiliary-equipment compartments.

It will be carried out, as for the preceding SNLE's, in the Homet form, for which, on this occasion, an improved infrastructure (covered form, improved handling facilities) will have been provided.

The purpose of the sea trials will be to qualify the vessel with a series of sorties designed to test its various functions: the hull, the diving system, propulsion, equipment, tactical armament and, of course, strategic armament.

Several Original Aspects

The first characteristic of this program is that it is ambitious. The ambition is manifest first of all in the short time-period allowed for construction: there will only have been 5 years and 3 months between the decision to build and the setting out to sea. Ambitious also was the fact of deciding to build in the M4 version within such a strained time frame that the program for that missile was not yet assured of success. With the recent launching of an M4 missile from the "Gymnote," this uncertainty is now removed.

The second characteristic is certainly the complexity of the program. Since the time of the pioneers of the "Redoutable," many technical problems have been solved, to be sure--those relative to nuclear energy in particular. Nevertheless, the M4 version is very complex in the area of armament and equipment. In effect, the use of a centralized information system, in the form of a pool of computers that "dialogue" with the various systems, implies quite a few important problems. Some of them have necessitated the setting-up of "integration platforms" designed to qualify several subsystems on land. In the last analysis, it is on board the "Inflexible" that the whole of these data-processing units will be tested for the first time. The complexity of such tests under on-board conditions can be imagined.

Another less well-known characteristic of the program for the SNLE-M4's lies in the fact that the studies for this type of vessel are being carried out in two phases. The first phase involves the building of a new vessel [the "inflexible"] the plans for which are to be applicable, in the longer run, to the other SNLE's during their refitting. The second phase will involve making the re-fitted SNLE's identical to the "Inflexible"--which will require a great many checks. It is indeed imperative, in order for the deterrent system to function correctly, for all the vessels, once refitted, to be identical with one another and with the "Inflexible."

The last characteristic, also little-known, is that a good part of this program involves various branches of the French economy. First of all, it is important to keep it in mind that more than half the cost of the "Inflexible" (speaking of the submarine without reference to the missiles) is, in short, in the form of orders from industry. These orders cover the main part of the supplying of materiel, but also the technical assistance associated with it. They also include a sizable part of the supplying of semifinished products. Furthermore, the impact of this financial mass is distributed very widely throughout the national territory; thus the "Inflexible," a guarantor of the defense of all the French, is planting the roots of its fabrication in the most varied territories of our country.

MILITARY

FRANCE

THOMSON-CSF GIVES DETAILS ON RADAR FOR NEW NAVAL WEAPONS

Paris AVIATION MAGAZINE INTERNATIONAL in French 15-30 Jun 82 pp 44-45

[Article: "Thomson-CSF (General Radio Co): New Naval Weapons Systems"]

[Text] For the many journalists who were invited to Thomson-CSF's new installations at Sophia-Antipolis, near Nice, the day of 7 May will certainly remain one of the most striking, professionally speaking, in their personal experience. On that day, Thomson-CSF literally gave itself over to a debauch of information on the new naval weapons systems, and to hear the murmurs of relaxation that filled the conference room when the last presentations were made, some must have been stricken with "electronic indigestion." The menu was indeed of the most extensive: 12 extremely dense presentations, delivered at full speed, in the course of a single day.

But after all, who would dream of reproaching the No 1 French electronics firm for the solitary effort it is making to inform the press intelligently? In this regard, it would be desirable, we stress, for other French firms to take inspiration from the initiatives of Thomson-CSF and, like that company, to be fully aware of the fact that the didactic aspect of the presentations--that is, operational end-purpose--constitutes, if not an obligatory waypoint, at least the best possible introduction for presentation of the materiel developed.

For surface detection, it had to be specified, in one of the presentations, that the execution of such a mission necessarily requires the simultaneous use of several types of pickups--radars, acoustic systems, electronic-war means, IFF [Identification Detector For Friend or Foe], magnetic-anomaly detectors, optronic devices--since none of these sensors, used individually, could carry out such a complex task by itself. The second notion that should be stressed concerns the necessary integration of the various systems used. This is because any maritime-surveillance mission implies first of all the establishment and continual updating of a "surface" situation obtained by intelligence--in other words, that the exact position of all ships, submarines and other moving units be continually transmitted in real time to the aircraft on patrol and that friend-enemy identification information be associated with each of them.

As regards radars carried on board, Thomson-CSF presented three X-band (9-10 GHz) radars of very high performance, already well-known: the Iguane, the Varan and the Agrion 15. These radars all use the pulse-compression technique, which makes it possible both to obtain considerable transmission (long-range)

energy and to use a very fine pulse, making it possible to eliminate the parasite effect of the waves.

To give an idea of the performance-characteristic differences from conventional radars considered to fulfill the same mission, it should be understood that the maritime-surveillance radars developed by Thomson-CSF transmit pulses 10 times shorter than those of the magnetron systems and that the instantaneous powers obtained after pulse compression are 35 times higher. These characteristics, translated into terms of range, amount to saying that a submarine's snorkel can be detected at a distance of more than 35 NM (55 km), and that frigates under difficult sea conditions (30-knot wind for several days) are detected at distances on the order of 150 NM (250 km)--detection ranges that conventional radars cannot achieve.

But one of the aspects that should be stressed concerns the compactness and light weight of some of this materiel. The Varan radar, for example, an anti-ship version derived from the Iguane and adopted by the Navy Air Force for the Gardian maritime-surveillance plane, is six to eight times lighter than its principal competitors.

This system, which has also made a successful demonstration tour in India, the Near East and Africa (it is capable of detecting schools of tuna at a distance of more than 50 kilometers), is presented as three to nine times more discrete than any other known pulse-compression radar.

The Iguane, which will be carried on the "Atlantic New-Generation" plane and will be presented at the next naval exposition, has already proved its effectiveness in a Breguet Alize fleet. On the ANG [Atlantic New-Generation], it will be completely integrated with a new tactical system comprising an ESM [expansion unknown] subsystem, the Arar 13, and an acoustical subsystem, the Sadang.

The Anaconda (airborne Doppler coherent analyzer) device, mounted in conjunction with the Varan radar, makes it possible to obtain a very-high-resolution image in real time. This system, which does Doppler processing of the lateral-sweep with synthetic antenna (Slar) type, is intended for two types of application: the mission of surveillance of the 200-NM economic zone, and in particular, detection of marine pollution and aid to classification, since the excellent image detection permits recognition of forms.

We mention that the system as a whole can also be equipped with an IFF NRAI-10A interrogator fitted with the latest improvements (transistorized transmitter, antijamming, RSLS [expansion unknown] in reception and transmission, interlacing, mode-4 compatibility, integrated automatic testing) that is especially well-suited to the Varan radars, of course, but also to the Iguanes.

The Agrion has, vis-a-vis the preceding two radars, the particular characteristic of being a complete guidance system for the AS-15TT air-to-sea missile (range, 15 km) developed by Aerospatiale. It has been announced that the first firing of an AS-15TT missile from a Dauphin helicopter will take place at the end of 1982.

Thomson-CSF also furnished information on a new integrated tactical system, the Nautac, derived from the system that will equip the ANG. The Nautac, developed in cooperation with Aerospatiale for the navalized version of the Super Puma helicopter, is intended essentially for export. It is composed of either the Agrion 15 radar or the Varan radar and an electronic-warfare system that can be either the DR-2000 Dalia or the DR-4000.

Furthermore, it is planned for the Nautac to be able to receive data transmitted by Lamparo acoustical buoys and those furnished by a sonar. Coupled with the navigation system of the helicopter or maritime-patrol plane, the Nautac can also be used for weapons activation.

Many other systems were presented by the Thomson-CSF specialists. We shall come back to them at greater length later.

11267
CSO: 3100/790

WAYS TO MODERNIZE, DEPLOY AMX 13 TANK PRESENTED

Paris ARMEE ET DEFENSE in French May-Jun 82 pp 5-8

[Article by Patrick H Mercillon*: "AMX's for the Reserve"]

[Text] The AMX 13 light tank and its various versions (repair tanks, bridge-laying tanks, self-propelled 105-millimeter guns, etc.) are now being replaced by new equipment.

Thus, the mechanized infantry regiments are slowly swapping their VTT AMX 13 Mle 56's [cross-country vehicles] for AMX 10P tanks, their AMX 13/90's for AMX 30 B's, and their missile-launching AMX 13/75 SS 11's for Milan missile launching stations. It will take the entire decade of the 1980's for the last specialized versions of the AMX 13 (ambulance vehicles, the RATAc [Firing Radar for Field Artillery], the AMF 3's, and the B 30's) to be retired from service, but already now some models are in the process of rapid phasing out. Among these is the AMX 13 with a 90-millimeter gun. The problem has already been raised as to what to do with these light tanks. Some suggest getting rid of them. Indeed, these AMX 13/90's can be passed on to foreign countries as part of French military assistance, sold, scrapped for their metal, or used on firing ranges. The arguments which support this proposal derive from the difficulty of continuing to maintain these "old" types of equipment and from the fact that it is difficult to see to what end and for whom they could be used. This view would solve the problem by eliminating it.

Is the AMX 13 Outdated?

Is the AMX 13/90 really outdated? This armored vehicle was planned in the late 1940's. It was consequently placed in to service more than 30 years ago, thus breaking the longevity record of the Renault FT 17 light tank whose career in the French Army exceeded 23 years.

The AMX 13 was designed after World War II and its planning factored in the enormous progress made during the 4 years of conflict. Its performance in terms of mobility, firepower, and protection is completely acceptable even today and in no way parallels the chasm which separated the characteristics

*Editor's note: This article expresses only the personal opinion of the author.

of the FT 17 from the contemporary tanks of 1940. A large number of armored vehicles introduced into service recently have mobility characteristics comparable to those of the AMX 13. With its 90-millimeter gun, the AMX 13 still enjoys strong firepower, still subject to improvement thanks to the [armor piercing] arrow projectiles as we shall see later on. Starting from the premise that the two most important characteristics of a tank--its mobility and firepower--are still relevant today, the protection of the AMX 13 is not to be sneered at. Its armor plate protects it from the fire of the heavy 12.7-millimeter machinegun in the forward area, which is, for instance, the case with the completely new AMX 10 RC and many other recently designed armored vehicles.

Success of the Light Tank

Is the light tank, now that the new generation of medium-sized tanks weighs found in facts. Modern light tanks such as the British Scorpion or the Austrian Kurassier benefit from immense marketing success. The Kurassier, produced by Steyr-Puch enterprise, is nothing other than the French FL 12 turret of the AMX 13 with a 105-millimeter gun mounted on a modern hull. In all, 786 of these Kurassiers were sold across the world. The Austrian Kurassier indeed appears as a modernized version of the AMX 13 which France was unable to make available for export, undoubtedly so as not to jeopardize the sales of the AMX 30 abroad. A new category of armored vehicles has recently made its appearance, a category which includes all the characteristics of the light tank. Involved are the FSV's (Fire Support Vehicles for Support or fire support), which represent the result of mounting the turret of an armored car equipped with a cannon ranging from 76 to 90 millimeters on the hull of an armored troop transport vehicle. In this category one may cite the German TAM, the M113AZ FSV, or the AMX 10 PAC-90, all of which are tracked vehicles, or wheeled vehicles such as the Swiss Mouvag Piranah or the Belgian SIB-MAS.

To Make New Out of Old

In addition to the fact that these recent products resemble the AMX 13 very closely is the fact that many armed forces are satisfied with modernizing their old tanks:

1. Argentina, which has rebuilt its [American] M4 Sherman tanks dating from World War II with a French Poyaud diesel engine and a French 105-millimeter gun.
2. Norway, which has replaced the engines of its M24 Chaffees with an American diesel power plant and rearmed them with the AML's 90-millimeter gun.
3. Brazil, which is completely rebuilding its old American M3 Stuart tanks and which has also adopted the AML's 90-millimeter cannon.
4. Israel, which dipped into its reserves of M4 Sherman tanks with French 75- or 90-millimeter guns from the AMX 13 to make up for the heavy losses it sustained in medium-sized tanks early in the October 1973 war. To general surprise, the old Sherman tanks have been able, thanks to their relatively modern artillery, to still put up a good show vis-a-vis the Soviet T 54 and T 55 tanks. The Israelis were delighted to have kept them.

One could also cite the example of the Republic of Singapore, whose armored vehicles consist exclusively of AMX 13's repurchased in Israel, Switzerland, and India. The Singapore Government expects to use its 320 AMX 13's as rapid mobile units in case of communist infiltrations in Thailand and northern Malaysia. Only the AMX 13 seems capable to the Singaporeans of using all the bridges of the region and they appreciate its speed and deployment capabilities. The Singaporeans are interested in the 90-millimeter arrow projectile and are implementing a very smart modernization program in connection with their AMX 13's, planned by local industry in cooperation with the army.

Minimum Modernization

Here, then, is the real, essential problem of the AMX 13. Conserved intact, it is true that its upkeep will prove to be more and more difficult. But a limited program for upgrading the mechanical system points to a solution. The Singaporeans have thus planned a modernization program by successive stages so that they may use the present engine and gearbox to the end and stagger the cost of the program as much as possible. They are striving, first, to simplify maintenance by modifying or replacing certain parts. They have thus succeeded in reducing to a third the time necessary to change the power plant. Later they are planning to replace the gasoline-driven engine by a more fuel-efficient diesel motor, which will increase the tank's operational range.

In contrast, the principal armament can be retained as is. The AMX 13's 90-millimeter cannon is capable of firing arrow projectiles developed for the 90-millimeter F 4 gun which is mounted on the ERC 90 Sagace and the AMX 10 PAC-90 vehicles. There is thus a tremendous possibility to upgrade the artillery of the AMX 13 without replacing it. The oscillating turret of the FL 10 still retains all the advantages given to it by its simple and reliable automatic loading system using two cylinders. Its firing rate is unequalled. It is possible to select the ammunition a cylinder at a time and to have, for example, six arrow projectiles loaded in one cylinder and six explosive shells loaded in the other. The loading capacity of the cylinders (12 rounds) is easily sufficient for the type of use of a light tank. In a reconnaissance or ambush mission, it is impossible to empty the ammunition cylinders in a single engagement, for two to three cannon rounds fired in quick succession already constitute the limit of possible tactical maneuver if the tank wishes to survive the engagement. Furthermore, the oscillating turret offers, as is known, elusiveness from fire as well as elusiveness from observation. Thanks to its low and very small profile, the AMX 13 can be concealed anywhere, behind the smallest grove or the slightest unevenness in terrain, which is not true of medium-sized tanks like the AMX 30.

At a time when research on the future tank bears on automatic loading and on the reduction in the dimensions of the armament turrets in the superstructure, the AMX 13 has enjoyed all these advantages for 30 years.

Modernization of the AMX 13 tanks would not be free of cost and the necessary funds would have to be found for it in the armed forces budget. But the cost of such a program can be limited to acceptable dimensions to the extent that only the mechanical system needs modernization and this can be effected in

successive stages as in Singapore. The last objection made to the AMX 13 is its lack of a CBR [Chemical, Biological, Radiological Warfare] protection system which subjects the environment to high pressure and filtering. It can be noted, however, that the AML's of regiments on active duty are in the same state and that between the total lack of protection of a jeep carrying a 106-millimeter recoilless gun and the limited protection afforded by the armor of the AMX 13, the choice is easy.

What Would Be the Use of the AMX 13 in the Reserve?

The majority of the reconnaissance regiments of the 10 mobilized reserve infantry divisions are equipped with 36 jeeps carrying 106-millimeter recoilless cannons. For the time being the reservists of the ABC [Armored Cavalry Corps] which make up these regiments are satisfied with the beneficent effects of the mobilization plan's reform. They have received, equipment, are training regularly, and are actively preparing for vertical callups. We are at the stage at which the efforts of everyone bear on the creation of ancillary regiments, on new activities. Even if equipment is old, it is better than not having materiel at all. But in the long run, when these reservists will have become accustomed to their new tempo of instruction, when all the ancillary regiments will have reached their cruising level, when they will be functioning perfectly, the time will come when all will be seriously concerned with the equipment with which they are outfitted and when new demands will arise. Who, beyond 1985, will still accept the jeep with the 106-millimeter recoilless gun when it will have become obvious that its hollow charge shells will no longer pierce the armor of modern tanks and that its range is really ridiculously short. Some will say that this is unimportant since these regiments are especially designed for DOT [Operational Defense of the Territory] missions and therefore for engagements against commando or paratroop units. But the reservists will undoubtedly end up by perceiving one day that their recoilless 106's can no longer be used even as antipersonnel weapons since there are no explosive 106-millimeter shells in the inventories of the French Army. Until when will the jeep with the 106-millimeter gun be retained and with what will it be replaced? With AML's? But the program for replacing the AML's is still in limbo. The AML's on active duty will thus remain in service for many more years and it is hard to see how one could replace the jeep 106's with AML's while the AML's themselves will have been withdrawn from those reserve regiments equipped with them to beef up active duty units. Why, under these conditions, not distribute among the reserve units AMX 13's which are immediately available rather than wait for a hypothetical replacement of the AML's since it is already known that the jeeps with 106-millimeter recoilless guns will by then have no military value assuming they have any now, at least in the form of use anticipated for them.

Rapid Intervention Capability

One of the missions of the mobilized infantry divisions is to move anywhere in French territory to check amphibious or airborne operations. These last few years that Soviets have developed an impressive landing fleet: Protected craft, tank transport vessels attack gliders, aircraft carriers, and so on. In case of conflict the Soviets also anticipate stepping up the rate of their

advance by launching large-scale airborne operations far ahead of the frontline. Amphibious operations and large-scale paratroop drops are part of a specific concept in the Soviet Army, that of the "100" operations, which may be strategic (the taking of a strait, etc.) or tactical (a paratroop breakthrough 100 or 200 km behind the lines, etc.). The French reserve forces are undoubtedly incapable, as they are now equipped, of facing this kind of attack. On one hand one finds the elite units, well trained and heavily armed (with 81- and 120-millimeter mortars, 23-millimeter double-barreled antiaircraft guns, anti-tank guns, multiple rocket-launchers, BMD paratroop transport armored vehicles, ASU 85 attack cannons, etc.) compared to reservist units which are almost totally lacking in heavy armament (they have nine 81-millimeter mortars per division, by way of total artillery, 36 105-millimeter recoilless guns, and a few 75-millimeter recoilless guns but without adequate ammunition). By way of a foil it would be enough to use personnel of the 11th Paratroop Division and their equipment during a vertical callup of a reserve division to envision what would happen in wartime in the face of Soviet paratroops. Should the battle be raging in the east, it is hard to see how one could withdraw from the main front the smallest major unit of the battle corps, an improved infantry division, much less a paratroop division, to help the reserve.

In contrast, intervention in the face of this kind of operations by regiments equipped with AMX 13's would be completely different if, for example, what is involved are mixed reconnaissance regiments with jeeps and AMX 13's, organized in separate squadrons or with a mix in the squadrons. In the face of an ASU 85 or a double-barreled 23-millimeter gun, an AMX 13 at least fights with a similar or even longer reach, which is not the case of the jeep with the 106-millimeter recoilless gun whose range is half that.

It is often said that reserve divisions do not have artillery while self-propelled 105-millimeter AMX 13 Mle 50's are being scrapped. The reserve infantry regiments are complaining that they depend on requisitions for the means of transportation and that an effort is being made to get rid of the VTT AMX 13 Mle 56's. The eight general reserve artillery regiments are equipped with drawn 155-millimeter BP 50 mortars and no thought is given to mechanizing them by mounting them on recuperated AMX 13 hulls in analogy to the self-propelled AM F3 mortar or as the Israelis mounted their drawn BF 50's on the hulls of M4 Sherman tanks. It must be determined whether the necessary funds are available to establish an appropriate and militarily effective reserve system. Otherwise, the existing 10 reserve divisions cost too much for the pleasure of allowing reservists to gather one Saturday on a month and one week every 5 or 6 years instead of the 4 years originally anticipated between vertical callups. Equipped as they are, the reserve divisions risk playing a role that is about the same as that of the member of the territorial army 40 years ago when he would guard a bridge, his bayonet mounted on his 07/15 rifle, and so on.

Within the framework of the missions entrusted to the reserve divisions, the AMX 13/90 has the advantage of being a light tank that is capable of intervening fast and anywhere, there are still many reservists trained on AMX 13's, those who are familiar with the AMX 30's can easily be retrained. Instruction on the AMX 13 is not complicated. Some specialized version of the AMX 13 (the

VCG's [army engineers combat vehicles], the ambulance vehicles, the self-propelled F 3's, the B 30's, and so on) will still be in use for a few years before their replacement with new equipment. It would undoubtedly be necessary to establish a new organization for the material support of tanks in the reserve. Some services might resist this additional task and argue how difficult it is, specifying that it had never been done before. But this type of objection could not hold.

At the official handing over of the AMX 30 B2 in January 1982 General Delaunay, chief of staff of the French Army, stated in essence that the strength of the armed forces was still computed in terms of the number of tanks they can field. With its approximately 1,000 AMX 30's, the French Army ranks 13th among the 21 member-states of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In a disquieting international situation the time has perhaps not arrived to get rid of the approximately 1,200 AMX 13's or of the VIT's, self-propelled guns, and all the versions derived from this light tank which are still serviceable, only to discover in some years that they could have been useful. The French Army has never adopted any renewal by half of its equipment, which makes it possible as in the army of the FRG to hand over to the reserve on a regular basis weapons that are still relatively modern. The possibility to do so exists with the AMX 13.

At any rate, the decision to get rid of the AMX 13 is serious and must be weighed carefully before being definitively implemented. One could first gather a committee representing the various interested parties: EMAT [General Staff of the Territorial Army], Inspectorate of the ABC, Inspectorate of the Reserves, Directorate of Equipment, DTAT [Technical Office for Land-Based Weapons], Creusot Loire Company, and others, and, during these times of democratic participation, representatives of the future users, the ABC reserve regiments. Then put the following question to the latter: "Do you prefer to go to war with jeeps carrying 106-millimeter recoilless guns or with modernized AMX 13 armored vehicles?" Guess what an overwhelming majority would manifest itself.

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CSO: 3100/797

MILITARY

FRANCE

RESERVE OF TACTICAL VEHICLES TO BE INCREASED, MODERNIZED

Paris ARMEE ET DEFENSE in French May-Jun 82 p 23

[Article: "Tactical Vehicles in 1982"]

[Text] The stock of tactical vehicles of the French Army will witness a significant modernization in 1982. This is the year when the initial 800 Peugeot P4 vehicles will be placed into service out of an overall order for 15,000 vehicles.

Furthermore, the Citroen model A 4X4, of which 5,000 are on order with 1,000 scheduled for delivery in 1982, will soon make its appearance. The A 4X4 powered by a Visa engine is characterized by an entirely metallic structure and four drive wheels.

In the range of personnel transport vehicles with a 2-ton payload, an initial lot of 350 tactical light trucks type TRM 2000 built by Renault Industrial Vehicles will be delivered to the army units during 1982.

In the 4-ton vehicle range, deliveries of TRM 4000's (which used to be designated as Saviem SH 8's) ordered since 1978 will continue in 1982 to the tune of 1,135 additional units of which 100 will be "Lot 7" repair trucks.

Finally, 85 heavy trucks, model TRM 10,000 are also slated for delivery in 1982.

The TRM 10,000, designed by Renault Industrial Vehicles, is a vehicle all of whose wheels are drive wheels (6X6) with a payload of 10 tons planned by civilian agencies to take advantage of very reasonable manufacturing and maintenance costs.

Several versions of this truck are planned: A heavy freight truck slated for logistical transportation or to move personnel (24 men); a heavy repair truck, this model to replace the wrecking trucks of American origin still in service such as the Ward La France M1A1 and later, gradually, the Berliet TBU 16 CLD's; a shelter-carrying truck; an artillery tractor-truck especially for the new 155 TR gun now being planned and which should, in the future, equip artillery regiments of infantry divisions.

Other verions of the TRM 10,000 are envisioned, too: Tank trucks for the transport of fuel or water and hopper trucks.

The TRM 10,000 is powered by a diesel engine boosted by a 6-cylinder turbocompressor (internal diameter of cylinder, 120 millimeters, tried out at 145 millimeters, with a cubic engine capacity of 9.839 liters) developing 266 horsepowers at 2,200 revolutions a minute.

The TRM 10,000 has a maximum road speed of 89 km/hour and can cross, fully loaded, gradients of 60 percent.

Without special preparation, it can ford water bodies 1 meter deep.

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CSO: 3100/797

MILITARY

SWEDEN

'SVENSKA DAGBLADET': SUBMARINE INTRUSIONS MUST BE COUNTERED

PM051307 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 31 Jul 82 p 2

[Editorial: "War Against Sweden?"]

[Text] It is of course no secret that the superpowers' general staffs are constantly engaged in planning for alternative military scenarios which also involve the strategically important Nordic region. Sweden's nonalignment with the objective of neutrality in war is not an obstacle to such planning.

In times of detente perhaps not so much attention is paid to such activities. But they assume very different proportions when international tension is increasingly rapid at the same time as interest in the Nordic region's strategic importance is growing more tangible.

Nevertheless, there must have been many who were startled by Swedish Armed Forces General Staff Chief Vice Adm Bengt Schuback's statement to SVENSKA DAGBLADET on Friday [30 July]: "A foreign power is preparing for war against Sweden...."

Of course the statement should not be taken to mean that a major power has decided on a date for an attack on Sweden. What is important is that it is being made clear to the Swedish public that plans are being made for military operations against Sweden in a given world situation and that it is largely dependent on our own defense forces whether such an operation is judged too costly or not.

Schuback's statement was made in connection with the most recent reports of foreign submarine activity in Swedish waters. The defense forces are convinced that foreign submarines were within Swedish waters during the alerts earlier this year in Kvarken, the Stockholm archipelago and the Aland Sea. In addition Schuback confirmed that a submarine passed through Finnish waters on its way home. The submarine passed east of Aland.

Nothing has been said to indicate whether the Finnish authorities identified this submarine or not. Schuback was unwilling to comment on the possibility. This could indicate that positive identification did occur, but that this is being kept secret for various reasons. Nevertheless it is still not that difficult for the uninitiated to draw their own conclusions.

The assumption of war plans has gradually grown into what Schuback calls a "relatively strong conviction." There could be various reasons for the border violations--preparations for attacks on Swedish naval combat forces, exercises for landing troops or saboteurs. One possible objective is reconnaissance for the future use of Swedish waters as base areas in crisis situations.

It goes without saying that Sweden must do everything to counter and prevent these intrusions. The latest defense budget legislation gives the navy a better foundation for its surveillance activities. From 1 July next year the rules have been tightened up so that it will be possible to identify the intruder. New weapons will come into service which will be able to force submarines to the surface.

Is it possible that a foreign power is trying to make the best use of this period of grace?

However, the most recent Swedish suspicions of foreign submarines have not been confirmed. It is after all quite easy to make oneself look ridiculous because of reports which prove to be mistaken. But it is much better to have been wrong than to allow a foreign submarine to continue its activities undisturbed. With our long coastline it is essential that the whole of the coastal population form something of a home guard whose task it is to sound the alarm.

However, on one point SVENSKA DAGBLADET would like to express its disagreement with Schuback. It is of course possible to question from the strictly military viewpoint the open reporting of the fate of Soviet Submarine 137 in Swedish waters. It was a source of valuable information for the other side.

Nevertheless, of greater importance is the great value that the dramatic reports from the Blekinge archipelago [i.e., Karlskrona area] had for the Swedes' interest in and desire to strengthen their own defenses.

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